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We present a Markov perfect equilibrium for a dynamic limit order market.
For simplicity, we assume that traders have symmetric information and that
limit orders expire in two periods after their submission. In equilibrium, when
sellers enter the market consecutively, the best ask decreases tick by tick. Once
the best ask reaches a certain level, it jumps more than one tick, creating a hole
in the book. A trade-oﬀ between price improvement and execution probability
in submitting orders causes such quote jumps.
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11 Introduction
In limit order markets, traders can submit both limit orders that are contingent on price
and market orders that are not. Orders are matched and transactions take place accord-
ing to the trading rule speciﬁed by an exchange. The question is what is the optimal
order submission strategy under a certain market condition. As a consequence of traders
optimally submitting orders, how do quotes change and how do transactions take place?
The exchange can aﬀect order submissions and transactions through a trading rule such
as the tick size which is the minimum price variation. Is the smaller tick size better for
the exchange? These questions are important because limit order markets are prevalent
as the execution systems of many ﬁnancial markets.
To answer these questions, we consider a situation in which sellers and buyers arrive
randomly in each period and submit an order to the exchange. We further assume that
limit orders automatically expire in two periods after their submission. In general, limit
orders incur the cost of uncertain execution, delayed execution, and adverse selection.
These assumptions allow us to concentrate on a trade-oﬀ between price improvement and
execution uncertainty. We set aside the eﬀect of asymmetric information .1 For example,
Chordia et al. (2005) report that information is very quickly incorporated in prices for
frequently traded stocks in the New York Stock Exchange, which implies considerable
amounts of transactions take place with less asymmetric information. In addition, Ad-
mati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) argue that orders of liquidity traders aﬀect order submission
strategies of informed traders. Thus, investigating the behavior of liquidity traders seems
to be a reasonable step. As we will show, competition among liquidity traders can move
quotes in limit order markets even if there is no provision of new information nor any
asymmetry of information. This may be in contrast to quote dynamics in dealer mar-
kets studied by Easley and O’Hara (1992) where asymmetric information drives quotes
to change.
Our model has a pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibrium similar to an Edgeworth
cycle. We call it a quote-cutting equilibrium, in which if sellers enter the market con-
secutively, the best ask initially decreases tick by tick, and then jumps more than one
tick. The next quote rebounds to the less aggressive level, and the same cycle starts over
again. This cycling continues until a buyer arrives at the market. In a cycle, widening
the spread is faster than narrowing the spread.
The reasoning behind these quote dynamics is as follows. In submitting orders, traders
face a trade-oﬀ between price improvement and execution uncertainty; the more a trader
compromises on price, the more certainly he can trade. The ﬁrst seller arriving at the
market submits a limit sell order at a high ask and allows the next seller to undercut it
because the cost for deterring quote-cutting is signiﬁcant enough. The following sellers
1Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), among others, investigate the problem of
adverse selection for market makers.
2undercut the best ask by only one tick so as to minimize the cost in price to assure a higher
priority because they expect further quote-cutting. When the best ask drops to a certain
level, the next seller undercuts the best ask by more than one tick. Such an aggressive
order is reasonable because a high execution probability by deterring further quote-cutting
compensates for the substantial loss in price. The next seller facing the most aggressive
ask submits a limit order behind the market. This order is also reasonable because a low
execution probability is compensated by the less aggressive price.
In a quote-cutting equilibrium, quotes jump and “holes” emerge in the book. At a
hole there is no limit order even though limit orders currently exist at higher and lower
prices on the same side of the book. Holes in the book have been observed by Biais et
al. (1995) in the Paris Bourse, by Irvine et al. (2000) in the Toronto Stock Exchange,
and by Sand˚ as (2001) in the Stockholm Stock Exchange. A spread narrows rapidly when
the quote jumps, which creates holes. A hole accelerates the widening of a spread when
the market order hits the edge of the hole. Spreads and transaction prices can be volatile
due to holes. Our model predicts that the size of a hole is greater the more frequently
traders arrive because the large cost in quote-cutting is compensated by the large beneﬁt
in the execution probability. How holes emerge in the book and what aﬀects their size
are issues which remain for future empirical studies.
The tick size is the minimum cost in price for price priority, and aﬀects how traders
compete on price. A quote-cutting equilibrium exists if the tick size is small. On the other
hand, if it is large, there can be an equilibrium where traders do not compete on price but
queue at the same quote. We call it a queuing equilibrium. Such an equilibrium can exist
under the large tick size because the high cost for price priority inhibits quote-cutting.
Our numerical examples show that if the tick size is large, a queuing equilibrium and an
equilibrium with quote-cutting co-exist. Due to the multiplicity of equilibria, the eﬀect
of a tick size reduction on spreads can be ambiguous, which is in line with the empirical
ﬁndings of Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) in the Paris Bourse.
Several studies have investigated limit order markets. Glosten (1994), Chakravarty
and Holden (1995), Seppi (1997), Biais et al. (2000), Viswanathan and Wang (2002), and
Parlour and Seppi (2003) analyze them using static models. Dynamics models are used
by Cohen et al. (1981), Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Goettler et al. (2005), Foucault
et al. (2005), and Rosu (2006). Parlour (1998) presents a model for a limit order market
where the spread is the same as the tick size. By contrast, we consider a situation in
which the spread is so wide relative to the tick size that traders compete on price. Cohen
et al. (1981) and Foucault (1999) assume that limit orders expire in one period after
their submission. Under such a one-period expiration, the book has at most one limit
order, so that limit orders do not directly compete with each other. Foucault et al. (2005)
assume that limit orders can survive indeﬁnitely, and that traders have to undercut the
best quote in submitting limit orders. Foucault et al. (2005) and the present study share
some results, e.g., the possibility of holes emerging in the book. One diﬀerence, however,
3is that our results suggest that traders place limit orders outside the best quotes, which
can make widening the spread faster than narrowing the spread. Submission of such
orders is discussed by Cohen et al. (1981), and documented by Griﬃths et al. (2000) in
the Toronto Stock Exchange, by Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) in the Island ECN, and by
Biais et al. (1995) and Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) in the Paris Bourse. Of the other
articles, Goettler et al. (2005) solve for equilibrium numerically, and Rosu (2006) studies
a continuous-time model. By assuming traders can adjust their orders instantaneously,
Rosu (2006) investigates the shape of the book where every limit order yields the same
expected utility. His traders can move very fast while our traders are so slow that they
have to commit to their prices for a while.
Maskin and Tirole (1988) investigate price competition in an oligopolistic market, and
Cordella and Foucault (1999) in a dealer market. A quote-cutting equilibrium presented
here corresponds to an Edgeworth cycle equilibrium in Maskin and Tirole (1988). They
consider how long-lived producers or dealers set prices only on the one side of the market.
Our results show that an Edgeworth cycle is observed even if short-lived public traders
set prices on both sides of the market. Myopic consideration of a trade-oﬀ between price
improvement and execution uncertainty can create an Edgeworth cycle.2
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model. Section 3 demon-
strates equilibrium when limit orders expire in one period after their submission in order
to explain the structure of our model in detail. Sections 4 and 5 present a queuing equi-
librium and a quote-cutting equilibrium under the two-period expiration of limit orders,
respectively. We discuss the case where limit orders survive longer periods in Section 6.
Until then, we assume that traders are homogeneous in patience. We brieﬂy discuss the
eﬀect of heterogeneity in patience in Section 7. Section 8 summarizes empirical implica-
tions along with the the eﬀect of a tick size reduction. Section 9 contains some concluding
remarks. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
This section provides the model. We explain types of traders, orders traders can choose,
the state of the book, the trading rule, and equilibrium concept. At the end of this section,
we lay out the assumption about expiration of limit orders. The model is a stochastic
game where the state of the book represents the state of the model, the type of trader
arriving at the market is stochastic, actions of traders are submitting orders, and the
trading rule speciﬁes payoﬀs for traders and transitions of the state of the book. We will
show some numerical examples of equilibria in Section 3.
2For example, Eckert (2003) and Noel (2006) observe Edgeworth cycles in Canadian retail gasoline
markets.
42.1 Types of traders
There are discrete and inﬁnite periods, which are represented by τ ∈ {0,+1,...,+∞}. In
each period, one potential trader arrives at the exchange and submits an order. A trader
is either a seller, s, or a buyer, b. We denote the set of trader types by Θ = {s,b}.
The trader arrival is stochastic in the following way. Let α ∈ (0,1] be the probability
of a trader arriving, and β ∈ (0,1) be the probability of a seller conditional on a trader
arriving. That is, in each period, the trader is a seller with the probability πs = αβ ∈
(0,1), and a buyer with the probability πb = α(1−β) ∈ (0,1). No trader arrives with the
probability z = 1 − πs − πb ∈ [0,1). Let π = (πs,πb) and Π = {π : 0 < πs < 1,0 < πb <
1,πs + πb ≤ 1}. The π represents the trader arrival. We assume that π is exogenous and
constant.
Sellers hold one share of the asset and evaluate it as vL ≥ 0. Buyers hold no shares
and evaluate a share as vH. We assume ∆ = vH − vL > 0. A payoﬀ for a seller is P − vL
if he sells a share at a price P. A payoﬀ for a buyer is vH − P if he buys a share at a
price P. If a trader does not trade, he receives zero payoﬀ. Traders choose an order to
maximize their expected utilities. The discount factor of every trader is assumed to be
one until Section 7. We assume traders are risk neutral.
A trader can submit an order only when he arrives at the market. We assume that a
trader himself cannot cancel or modify his order once he submits it. Thus, a trader faces
a static problem in choosing an order, which circumvents the complexity of a dynamic
problem.3
2.2 The orders
An action of a trader is the submission of an order. A set of actions depends on what
orders the exchange accepts. In the same way as typical limit order markets, we assume
that the exchange accepts a market sell order (MS), a market buy order (MB), a limit
sell order (LS), and/or a limit buy order (LB). We restrict the volume of each order to
one share.
A trader speciﬁes a price, or a quote, in submitting a limit order. The price of
a LS is an ask, say A, and the price of a LB is a bid, say B. The exchange desig-
nates the tick size k > 0 which is the minimum price variation, and a trader must
choose a price from the pricing grid Nk = {0,k,2k,...}. We denote k = 0 when a
real number is allowed for a price. For simplicity, we assume that vH and vL are on
the pricing grid, vL ∈ Nk and vH ∈ Nk. In summary, the set of available orders is
X = {no order,a MS,a MB,a LS at A,a LB at B : A ∈ Nk,B ∈ Nk}.
3Both Goettler et al. (2005) and Foucault et al. (2005) exclude, as we do, the possibility of resubmission
of orders. An exception at present is Rosu (2006), who assumes that traders can cancel and change orders
at will.
52.3 The state of the book
When a limit order is submitted to the exchange, it is stored in the book until its execution
or expiration. The book holds information regarding a price of a limit order and when
the limit order is submitted. Let ω be a state of the book, or simply a book, and let Ω
be the set of all states of the book. See Appendix A.1 for the concrete deﬁnition of Ω.
A lower (higher) price for an ask (bid) is called a more aggressive price. In a book,
the best ask (bid) is the most aggressive ask (bid). Let A∗(ω) be the best ask and B∗(ω)
be the best bid of the book ω, respectively.
The spread is the diﬀerence between the best ask and the best bid. In order to calculate
the spread for the book without a LS or a LB, we assume, similar to Seppi (1997), that a
trading crowd implicitly provides LSs at vH and LBs at vL. In other words, if the book
does not have any LS (LB), the best ask (bid) is assumed to be vH (vL). The purpose of
this assumption is to calculate the spread for any book, and is irrelevant to an equilibrium
(see footnote 5).
2.4 The trading rule
We consider a transparent market with the pure price-time precedence rule and the dis-
criminatory pricing rule. The speciﬁc rule used here is as follows: (1) the market is
transparent in the sense that traders can observe the book when submitting an order.
(2) The exchange treats a MS as the LS at vL, and a MB as the LB at vH. (3) A LS
at or below the best bid and a LB at or above the best ask are called marketable. (4)
If an incoming order is not marketable, it is stored in the book. If it is marketable, it is
matched with an unﬁlled limit order on the opposite side of the book. (5) The priority
among limit orders is assigned by price, and by time for limit orders at the same price
due to a price-time precedence rule. (6) The transaction price is the quote of the limit
order waiting in the book due to the discriminatory pricing rule.
Under this trading rule, a MS, a LS at or below the best bid, a MB, and a LB at or
above the best ask are marketable. In what follows, we call marketable orders as market
orders. Market orders are executed at the best price in the book immediately after their
submission. We call the other orders, a LS above the best bid and a LB below the best
ask, as limit orders. Limit orders are stored in the book and wait for future market
orders.4
A seller never chooses no order, any buy order, a LS at or below vL, and a LS at or
above vH in an equilibrium.5 Thus, we restrict the set of orders for a seller facing the
4This trading process is similar to that of a bargaining model analyzed by Rubinstein (1982) and
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), in the sense that submitting a limit order corresponds to proposing a
price and submitting a market order corresponds to accepting it. They study transactions where two
persons negotiate a price while we study transactions where many persons propose prices at a given time
via the book.
5Because a buyer submits a MB to the book with very aggressive LS, there is always a LS yielding the
6book ω as X(s,ω) = {a MS,a LS at A : A ∈ (B∗(ω),vH)∩Nk} ⊆ X. Symmetrically, the
set of orders for a buyer facing the book ω is restricted to X(b,ω) = {a MB,a LB at B :
B ∈ (vL,A∗(ω)) ∩ Nk} ⊆ X.
2.5 Equilibrium concept
A strategy of a trader speciﬁes an order he submits. We consider a Markov strategy which
depends only on the type of a trader and on the current book, and depends neither on time
nor on the history of the book. In addition, we focus only on a pure strategy. We denote
a pure Markov strategy of a trader i ∈ Θ facing the book ω ∈ Ω as x(i,ω) ∈ X(i,ω). A
proﬁle of strategies is denoted as x = {x(i,ω) : i ∈ Θ,ω ∈ Ω}.
The expected utility of a seller in submitting an order is as follows. A LS submitted
to the book ω changes the book according to the trading rule. After the transition of the
book, the next trader arrives at the market according to the trader arrival π, and submits
a new order according to the proﬁle of strategies x. Thus, the execution probability of a
LS at A depends on ω, π, and x, and we denote it as Φ(s,A,ω,π,x). The payoﬀ of a MS
is B∗(ω) − vL. Consequently, the expected utility of an order x ∈ X(s,ω) for a seller is
V (s,x,ω,π,x) =
{
Φ(s,A,ω,π,x)(A − vL) if x is a LS at A
B∗(ω) − vL if x is a MS.
Symmetrically, the expected utility of an order x ∈ X(b,ω) for a buyer is
V (b,x,ω,π,x) =
{
Φ(b,B,ω,π,x)(vH − B) if x is a LB at B
vH − A∗(ω) if x is a MB.
where Φ(b,B,ω,π,x) represents the execution probability of a LB at B submitted to the
book ω under π and x.
As for equilibrium, we consider a pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibrium. That is, a
proﬁle of pure Markov strategies x∗ = {x∗(i,ω) : i ∈ Θ,ω ∈ Ω} consists of an equilibrium
if
x∗(i,ω) ∈ arg max
x∈X(i,ω)
V (i,x,ω,π,x∗) for ∀i ∈ Θ, ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Though a Markov perfect equilibrium allowing mixed strategies exists for which both
actions and states are ﬁnite, a pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibrium does not neces-
sarily exist. However, Theorem 3 in the Appendix shows that a pure-strategy Markov
perfect equilibrium indeed exists under certain conditions. Practically, the problem is not
the possibility of non-existence of an equilibrium but rather the multiplicity of equilibria
as discussed in Section 3.
positive expected utility for a seller. Thus, sellers never submit orders yielding zero or negative expected
utility, which are no order, any buy order, a LS at or below vL, and a MS to the book with a LB at or
below vL. The orders which buyers never submit are symmetric. Because buyers never submits a MB to
the book with a LS at or above vH, a seller never submits a LS at or above vH. Symmetrically, a buyer
never submits a LB at or below vL.
72.6 Assumption of order expiration
The analysis of limit order markets is complicated because the number of possible states of
the book can be large. To make the set of books simple, we assume that limit orders expire
automatically in certain periods after their submission. Foucault (1999) and Section 3
assume that limit orders expire in one period. The main results of this article presented
in Sections 4 and 5 assume that limit orders expire in two periods. The two-period
expiration is the simplest assumption to investigate direct quote competition of limit
orders. In Section 6, we will discuss the case where limit orders expire in longer periods
by numerical examples.
Some empirical studies report parts of limit orders are rapidly canceled after their
submission if they are not executed. Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) report that about 25%
(40%) of limit orders have been canceled within two (ten) seconds after their submission
on the Island ECN. Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002) report that the average time-to-
expiration or cancellation of non-executed orders is 34.15 (46.92) minutes for limit sell
(buy) orders on the New York Stock Exchange. These studies suggest that limit orders
commit prices for short intervals similar to our assumption.
Short-lived limit orders can be interpreted as the consequence of the quick reaction of
traders. Even when a trader can adjust his limit order, his slow response may result in
competition with many limit orders submitted in the near future. We can consider the
above as a situation where limit orders expire in longer periods. On the other hand, if
traders react quickly to the transition of the book, limit orders face a smaller number of
incoming orders, which can be considered as shorter expiration periods of limit orders.
We can also consider that patience of traders reﬂects expiration periods of limit orders.
Let δ(t) be the discount factor for t periods ahead. The discount factors are assumed to
be δ(0) = δ(1) = δ(2) = 1 and δ(t) = 0 for t ≥ 3 for a trader who can await a transaction
only for two periods. This is the case of the two-period expiration of limit orders. In a
similar way, we can assume that limit orders expire in longer periods for a trader who can
await a transaction for longer periods. 6
3 Explanation of an equilibrium
Before presenting an equilibrium under the two-period expiration of limit orders, let us
revisit an equilibrium under the one-period expiration. Readers not interested in the
detail explanation of an equilibrium concept can skip to Section 4. Section 3.1 presents
an equilibrium, and Section 3.2 explains levels of quotes in the equilibrium. Most impli-
cations in these subsections have been discussed in Foucault (1999). We will apply these
implications to the case under the longer-period expiration. Section 3.3 presents numeri-
cal examples of pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria under the positive tick size. We
6Though this preference does not exhibit exponential discounting, time inconsistency is not a problem
here because a trader can submit an order only once in our model.
8discuss multiplicity of equilibria caused by the positive tick size. Section 3.4 presents
numerical examples of equilibria under the two-period expiration.
3.1 Equilibrium under one-period expiration
The next theorem provides a unique equilibrium under the one-period expiration of limit
orders.
Theorem 1 Suppose that limit orders expire in one period after their submission and
that the discount factor of every trader is one. If a limit order can be contingent on a
price of a real number, the following proﬁle of strategies is a unique equilibrium. Let Ar
and Br be
Ar =
(1 − πs)vH + πs(1 − πb)vL
1 − πsπb
, Br =
πb(1 − πs)vH + (1 − πb)vL
1 − πsπb
.
The strategy for a seller is to submit a MS if the book has a LB at B such as Br ≤ B,
but otherwise to submit a LS at Ar. The strategy for a buyer is to submit a MB if the
book has a LS at A such as A ≤ Ar, but otherwise to submit a LB at Br.
The proof is straightforward, since Ar and Br are the solutions to the simultaneous
equations
vH − Ar = πs(vH − Br), (1)
Br − vL = πb(Ar − vL). (2)
The limit prices Ar and Br are constructed for a buyer to submit a MB to a LS at Ar
if a seller submits a MS to a LB at Br, and vice versa. These equations show that the
expected utility by submitting a limit order is equal to the expected utility by submitting
a market order. A situation where a limit order and a market order yield the diﬀerent
expected utility does not constitute an equilibrium because traders can choose both types
of orders in limit order markets.
Theorem 1 is a special case of Proposition 3 in Foucault (1999) in the sense that the
asset value does not change over time. While Foucault (1999) considers a case where the
asset value ﬂuctuates over time, we simplify his model by assuming that the asset value
does not change, and extend it by stipulating that limit orders survive for longer periods
in order to analyze quote competition.
3.2 The level of quotes under the one-period expiration
Under the one-period expiration, the ask is strictly higher than the bid due to the dis-
continuity of the execution probability in price as the following proposition states.
Proposition 1 Under the equilibrium in Theorem 1, the ask is higher than the bid
(Ar > Br).
9If the book has a LB at Br, the execution probability of a LS at A ∈ (Br,Ar] is πb. The
execution probability of a sell order is discontinuous in price at Br because a seller can
trade at Br by a MS whose execution probability is unity. For a LS at an ask slightly above
Br, its gain in price relative to a MS cannot compensate for its loss in execution probability
due to discontinuity, which inhibits a seller from submitting a LS at A ∈ (Br,Ar). Cohen
et al. (1981) investigate an eﬀect of this discontinuity on the spread, referring to it as
a “gravitational pull.” As we will see, the discontinuity of execution probability in price
causes holes in the book under the two-period expiration.
Basically, the following relation between the trader arrival and the level of quotes
under the one-period expiration is preserved even under the longer-period expiration.
Proposition 2 Under the equilibrium in Theorem 1, (1) the ask Ar decreases in πs given
πb. The bid side is symmetric. (2) The ask Ar increases in πb given πs. The bid side
is symmetric. (3) For β > (3 −
√
5)/2 ≅ 0.38, the ask Ar decreases in α given β. The
bid side is symmetric. (4) The expected spread decreases in α given β. (5) The ask Ar
decreases in β given α. The bid side is symmetric.
In submitting a limit order, a trader has a monopoly power over future traders. How-
ever, he needs to satisfy participation constraints of future traders to extract their market
orders. Participation constraints of a future trader require that the expected utility from
a market order is equal to or higher than the expected utility from a limit order. Because
the higher execution probability πs of a LB raises the expected utility of a buyer in sub-
mitting a LB, a more aggressive ask is required to allure a MB. As a result, the ask Ar
decreases in πs as Proposition 2(1) states.
Symmetrically, the ask Ar increases in πb as Proposition 2(2) states. The higher
execution probability πb of a LS increases the expected utility of a seller; a buyer submits
a more aggressive LB, which reduces his expected utility; a less aggressive LS is suﬃcient
to extract a MB.
Equations (1) and (2) suggest that not α and β but πs and πb directly determine the
level of quotes, making comparative statics regarding α not simple as Proposition 2(3)
implies. The trader arrival rate α raises the execution probability and the expected utility
of a limit order. Thus, to extract a MB (MS), a limit order submitters need to submit
a more aggressive LS (LB). As a result, the spread becomes narrower as Proposition
2(4) states. At the same time, a more aggressive LB reduces the expected utility of a
buyer, and a less aggressive LS is suﬃcient to extract a MB. This counter eﬀect is strong
enough for small β, and the ask Ar does not decrease in α given small β as Proposition
2(3) implies. In what follows, we pay attention to the case of β = 1/2 partly because
comparative statics regarding α can be complicated. Another reason is that β = 1/2
seems to be reasonable under no asymmetric information among traders.
Proposition 2(5) states the eﬀect of the proportion of sellers and buyers on quotes.
When the share of sellers, β, is higher, a buyer gets the higher expected utility by sub-
10mitting a LB; a seller must submit a more aggressive LS to extract a MB; a buyer can
submit a less aggressive LB to extract a MS because a seller suﬀers from an aggressive
LS. As a result, when sellers arrive at the market more frequently, both sellers and buyers
post lower quotes.
3.3 Multiplicity of equilibria under the positive tick size
Theorem 1 says that an equilibrium is unique if limit orders expire in one period and if the
tick size is zero. If limit orders survive more than one period and if the tick size is zero,
the optimal strategy may not exist because the maximum ask undercutting the best ask
and the minimum bid overbidding the best bid do not exist due to the openness problem.
To ensure the existence of optimal strategies, we need to assume the positive tick size
k > 0 as in real exchanges. However, the discreteness in price can cause multiplicity of
equilibria as we will show in this subsection.
Consider parameter values of vH = 3, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2 under
one-period expiration of limit orders. Table 1 presents the states of the book and two
equilibria, Eq A and Eq B, under these parameter values. The book ω0 represents an
empty book. A seller facing an empty book can choose a LS at 1 or a LS at 2, and a
buyer facing an empty book can choose a LB at 1 or a LB at 2. There are the four other
states of the book, each of which is represented by an order in the book; ω1 is the book
with a LS at 1, ω2 is the book with a LS at 2, ω3 is the book with a LB at 1, and ω4 is
the book with a LB at 2. Eq A and Eq B are proﬁles of strategies specifying an order
each for a seller and a buyer, and for every state of the book. For example, in Eq A, a
seller submits a LS at 2 to an empty book ω0. The strategies denoted by * in the table
are those for the states on the equilibrium path.
Eq A in Table 1 is a discretized version of a unique equilibrium in Theorem 1 in which
Ar = 2 and Br = 1. We can verify that Eq A is indeed an equilibrium by checking if a
strategy for ∀i ∈ Θ to ∀ω ∈ Ω maximises the expected utility given the proﬁle of strategies
of Eq A. Let’s check if a LS at 2 is optimal for a seller facing an empty book ω0. If a
seller submits a LS at 1 to ω0, the book becomes ω1, the next trader is a buyer with
probability 1/2, and the next buyer submits a MB under Eq A. Thus, a LS at 1 to ω0
yields 1/2 as the expected utility. On the other hand, a LS at 2 to ω0 yields 1 as the
expected utility. Thus, a LS at 2 is optimal for a seller facing ω0. In the same way, the
optimality of strategies in Eq A is checked for ∀i ∈ Θ and ∀ω ∈ Ω.
The discrete pricing grid can cause multiple equilibria because optimal strategies can
be multiple. There are three equilibria for this numerical example. Table 1 presents two
of them, and the third equilibrium is symmetric to Eq B. Under Eq A, the optimal order
for a seller to ω3 is either a MS or a LS at 2 because both orders yield 1 as the expected
utility. Eq A designates a seller to submit a MS to ω3. On the other hand, there is another
equilibrium, Eq B, which designates a seller to submit a LS at 2 to ω3. As this example
suggests, discreteness in price causes multiplicity of optimal strategies, which can lead to
11multiple equilibria.
Another source of multiple equilibria is that unconstrained prices may fail on the
pricing grid. In this numerical example, if k ̸= 1/n for some integer n, Ar and Br in
Theorem 1 are not on the pricing grid. In such a case, there are multiple substitutes for
unconstrained prices Ar and Br, which can lead to multiple equilibria. To avoid this kind
of multiplicity, Theorem 3 in the appendix assumes that the critical prices belong to the
pricing grid, such as k = 1 for the above example.
The above examples suggest that we must be cautious in numerically examining limit
order markets because there can be multiple equilibria. We will show that an equilibrium
with quote-cutting and a queuing equilibrium coexist if the tick size is large, whereas a
queuing equilibrium does not exist if the tick size is small. The small tick size seems to
weaken the problem of the positive tick size by circumventing the multiplicity of optimal
strategies.7
3.4 Equilibrium under the two-period expiration
The model under the one-period expiration diﬀers with the model in the two-period
expiration in the set of the states of the book. Table 2 presents three numerical examples
of equilibria under the two-period expiration. The parameter values are the same as those
for Table 1 except for the expiration period of limit orders. The number of states of the
book is 19 under the two-period expiration, whereas the number is 5 under the one-period
expiration.
Quotes change under these equilibria in the following way. Under Eq 1, if sellers
arrive at the market consecutively, the ﬁrst seller submits a LS at 2 to an empty book,
the next seller submits a LS at 1 which undercuts the best ask by one tick. After that,
the next seller submits a LS at 2, and the same cycle starts again. Eq 1 exhibits both
quote-cutting and quote-rebounding. In Section 5, we will show how traders undercut
the best quote when the tick size is small. In contrast, every seller submits a LS at 2
under Eq 2, and every seller submits a LS at 1 under Eq 3. Eq 2 and Eq 3 are examples
of queuing equilibria. The next section will show that a queuing equilibrium can exist if
the tick size is large. We will return to the numerical examples in Table 2 in Section 8 to
discuss the eﬀect of a tick-size reduction.
7A positive tick size generates multiple equilibria in some models. For example, the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the bargaining game in Rubinstein (1982) is unique when the set of alternatives is a
continuum. In contrast, Van Damme et al. (1990) show that the bargaining game has multiple equilibria
when the set of alternatives is ﬁnite due to a positive tick size. Another example is the model of oligopolistic
markets in Maskin and Tirole (1988). They assume a positive tick size, yielding multiple equilibria.
124 Queuing equilibrium
This section demonstrates there can be a queuing equilibrium where traders queue at the
same quote if the pricing grid is coarse. To deﬁne a queuing equilibrium, let Aq be the
ask at which a seller submits a LS to an empty book. Symmetrically, let Bq be the bid
at which a buyer submits a LB to an empty book. An equilibrium is called queuing if a
seller submits a LS at Aq to the book with the two LSs at Aq, if the symmetric condition
for the bid side holds, and if some additional conditions are satisﬁed. We present the
formal deﬁnition of our queuing equilibrium in Deﬁnition 1 in the Appendix (refer to the
remarks followed by Deﬁnition 1 for the reasons behind our deﬁnition). Eq 2 and Eq 3 in
Table 2 are examples of queuing equilibria.
The next theorem states that a queuing equilibrium cannot exist if the tick size, k, is
small relative to the diﬀerence in valuation between sellers and buyers, ∆ = vH − vL.
Theorem 2 Suppose that limit orders expire in two periods and that the discount factor
of every trader is one. Let ks
q and kb
q be deﬁned as
ks
q = (1 − πs)(1 − πb)/{1 + (1 − πb)(2 − πs)(1 + 2πs − π2
s)},
kb
q = (1 − πs)(1 − πb)/{1 + (1 − πs)(2 − πb)(1 + 2πb − π2
b)}.
If the tick size k is equal to or smaller than ks
q∆ or kb
q∆, a queuing equilibrium deﬁned
by Deﬁnition 1 in the Appendix cannot exist.
A queuing equilibrium can exist under the coarse pricing grid because the large tick size
hinders quote-cutting by raising the cost in price to obtain price priority. For example,
if πs = πb = 1/2, 9ks
q < 1 < 10ks
q, suggesting that a queuing equilibrium can exist when
the diﬀerence in valuations between sellers and buyers is smaller than ten ticks.
A queuing equilibrium more likely to exist when the trader arrival rate, α, is large, as
the following proposition implies.
Proposition 3 Suppose β = 1/2 and πs = πb = α/2. ks
q = kb
q and ks
q decreases in α.
The higher trader arrival rate discourages quote-cutting by lowering the cost of waiting at
or behind the market. At the same time, the higher trader arrival rate makes quotes more
aggressive by raising the expected utility for traders on the opposite side of the market
as Proposition 2 suggests.
The next proposition shows that traders submit very aggressive limit orders in a
queuing equilibrium. Recall that if α = 1, πs = β and πb = 1 − β.
Proposition 4 Suppose that limit orders expire in two periods and that the discount
factor of every trader is one. In addition, suppose α = 1. Under a queuing equilibrium,
Aq − Bq ≤ (2 + 1/β/(1 − β))k − ∆.
13Under Eq 3 in Table 2, a seller submits a LS at 1, and symmetrically a buyer submits a LB
at 2. That is, the ask is lower than the bid on the equilibrium path. For another example,
under the parameter values vH = 6, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2, Proposition 4
states Aq − Bq ≤ 0. In fact, there are numerical examples of queuing equilibria whose
quotes are (Aq,Bq) = (3,3), (3,4), (2,3), and (2,4). For a queuing equilibrium with
(Aq,Bq) = (3,3), sellers and buyers queue at the same quote. Consequently, though
the positive spread is observed, every transaction takes place at the same price like a
transition in a call auction. This case is similar to that reported in Figure 3b by Biais
et al. (1995). Propositions 3 and 4 predict that a sequence of transactions at the same
price are frequently observed for actively traded stocks.
Aggressive quotes mentioned in Proposition 4 relates to the existence of a queuing
equilibrium. If the tick size is small, a seller has a strong incentive to undercut the extant
ask because he incurs a small cost in price to obtain price priority. To deprive the future
sellers of incentive for quote-cutting, the ﬁrst seller arriving at an empty book needs to
submit a very aggressive LS. If the tick size is suﬃciently small, the ﬁrst seller prefers
allowing future quote-cutting to preventing it. In such a case, he posts a high ask, and the
next seller undercuts it. As a result, a small tick size eliminates a queuing equilibrium, and
a quote-cutting equilibrium emerges. The next section will show how traders undercut
quotes in a quote-cutting equilibrium.
5 Quote-cutting equilibrium
This section is devoted to explaining a quote-cutting equilibrium which is an equilibrium
when limit orders expire in two periods and when the discount factor of every trader
is one. A quote-cutting equilibrium exists if the tick size is small. First, Section 5.1
demonstrates quote dynamics of a quote-cutting equilibrium using a numerical example.
Then, a corollary in Section 5.2 formally presents the equilibrium quote dynamics. Next,
we study the level of quotes and the size of holes. Section 5.5 discusses the allocational
eﬃciency. Section 5.6 presents other types of equilibria under the small tick size. Refer
to Appendix A.4 to A.7 for a complete explanation of a quote-cutting equilibrium.
5.1 A numerical example
In a quote-cutting equilibrium, there are four critical asks, Al, Au, Af, and Ah, deﬁned
by πs, πb, vH, and vL (refer to the Appendix for their deﬁnitions). They satisfy vL <
Al < Au < Af < Ah < vH. As we will see, Af is the ﬁrst ask submitted to an empty
book; Au is the end of the range of one-tick quote-cutting; Al is the lowest ask; and Ah
is the highest ask submitted on the equilibrium path.
There are three types of equilibria according to the trader arrival π ∈ Π. Since the
equilibrium quote dynamics are essentially the same for all types, this section explains
only the case under πs = πb = 1/2, that is, α = 1 and β = 1/2. Furthermore, we set
14vH = 21, vL = 0, and k = 1. Then, there are 1,261 states of the book. The tick size
k = 1 satisﬁes the conditions for the existence of a quote-cutting equilibrium. For these
parameter values, Al = 5, Au = 15/2, Af = 12, and Ah = 15. Since the critical ask Au is
not on the pricing grid, let A∗
u ∈ [Au,Au +k)∩Nk, i.e., A∗
u is the ask on the pricing grid
at or just above Au, and A∗
u = 8.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium quote dynamics. The solid lines indicate the asks
and the broken lines the bids. The two horizontal lines in one period mean that the book
has two limit orders. For example, the book has a LS at 12 in period 0, and LSs at 11
and 12 in period 1. The point indicates a transaction. For example, a transaction takes
place at price 10 in period 10.
In Figure 1, the ﬁrst ten traders are all sellers. After the ﬁrst ask posted in an empty
book at Af = 12, the best ask decreases tick by tick from Af = 12 to A∗
u = 8, then it
jumps from A∗
u = 8 to Al = 5 by three ticks. When the book has a LS at Al = 5 as
period 6, the next seller submits a LS at Ah = 15, and the best ask remains at 5. Then,
the same cycle of submission of LSs starts over again until a buyer arrives, i.e., a LS at
Af = 12 is submitted, and a LS at Al = 5 expires, which makes the best ask rebound
seven ticks from 5 to 12. After that, the best ask walks down the pricing grid tick-by-tick.
In period 10, a buyer appears, a transaction takes place, and the book becomes empty.
Quote dynamics of the bid side are symmetric as shown from period 11 to 20.
During quote competition, quotes jump and holes emerge, causing rapid quote changes.
In period 28 in Figure 1, the book has a large hole where an old LS at Al = 5 is posted
along with a new LS at Ah = 15. If a buyer arrives at this book and submits a MB
as shown in period 28, the LS at Al = 5 is executed, and the best ask falls back from
Al = 5 to Ah = 15. If sellers arrive after such a large quote jump, the best ask returns
to Af = 12. On the other hand, if two buyers arrive consecutively when the asks in the
book are Al = 5 and Ah = 15, as in periods 36 and 37, a transaction at 5 is immediately
followed by a transaction at 15. This example suggests that widening the spread is faster
than narrowing the spread, and that transaction prices can be volatile due to holes in the
book.
5.2 Quote dynamics
The next corollary stems from Theorem 3 in the Appendix, and formally presents the
quote dynamics of a quote-cutting equilibrium illustrated in Figure 1.
Corollary 1: In a quote-cutting equilibrium, sellers submit the following LSs on the equi-
librium path. A seller submits a LS at Af to the book with no limit order. If sellers arrive
consecutively after the submission of a LS at Af, the ask submitted to the book declines
from Af − k to A∗
u tick by tick, drops down to Al, jumps back up to Ah, then falls to
Af. After the return to Af, the same cycle repeats itself until a buyer arrives. A buyer
submits a MB if the book has LSs on the equilibrium path. The bid side is symmetric.
15On the equilibrium path, the book does not have both LSs and LBs at the same time
because a trader submits a limit order to which future traders on the opposite side of the
market will submit market orders.8
Sellers compete in quotes in the following way. When the tick size is small, a ﬁrst
seller arriving at an empty book allows future quote-cutting and submits a LS at a high
ask Af. After submission of the ﬁrst ask Af to an empty book, one-tick quote-cutting
occurs up to A∗
u. Because the asks higher than the most aggressive ask, Al, will be
undercut by the future sellers, sellers undercut the best ask by only one tick to minimize
the cost in price to acquire price priority. When the best ask reaches A∗
u, the next seller
submits the most aggressive ask, Al, on the equilibrium path, which he makes low enough
to deter further quote-cutting. Preventing further quote-cutting provides the LS at Al
with a discontinuously high execution probability, which compensates for the large cost
in price. That is, a discontinuity in execution probability causes the best ask to jump
more than one tick. In facing Al as the best ask, the next seller submits the LS at the
least aggressive ask, Ah. Such an order awaits a transaction opportunity in case the limit
orders with higher priority are cleared from the book. It is reasonable because the gain
in price covers the loss in execution probability. The ask Af is the optimal to an empty
book, implying that Af is also the optimal to the book whose best ask is higher than Af.
Thus, after the submission of a LS at Ah, the next seller submits a LS at Af and the
same cycle repeats itself.
The ﬁrst ask submitted to an empty book, Af, is lower than the ask submitted behind
the market, Ah, for the following reason. To extract MBs, a seller needs to compensate
future buyers for the expected utility from LBs. A buyer facing the book with a LS
submitted one period ago does not compete with the next buyer because the next buyer
will submit a MB to the existing LS. This makes the expected utility from a LB to the
book with a LS submitted one period ago higher than the expected utility from a LB
to the book with a LS submitted two periods ago. As a result, Af which extract a MB
from the next buyer is lower than Ah which extract MBs from buyers two periods ahead.
In an equilibrium of a limit order market, there is a marginal trader who is indiﬀerent
between a market order and a limit order. On the equilibrium path under the two-period
expiration, the buyers facing the book whose best ask is Af or Ah are marginal traders.
During quote-cutting, sellers submit more aggressive LSs, and buyers facing such LSs
enjoy the high expected utility from MBs. That is, a market order is more advantageous
than a limit order in the process of quote-cutting.
Quote-cutting in Corollary 1 is similar to those reported in Cordella and Foucault
(1999) and Foucault et al. (2005). Cordella and Foucault (1999) investigate quote com-
8Rosu (2006) studies a continuous time model of limit order markets with heterogeneous traders in
patience. In his model, the book has either LSs or LBs, but not both at once when all traders are patient.
This feature is shared by the outcome of our model. The small tick size seems to be one of causes of this
feature because the book has both a LS and a LB on the equilibrium path in Eq 2 of Table 2.
16petition between two dealers while Foucault et al. (2005) investigate quote competition
when a seller and a buyer arrive at the market alternatively. Our quote-cutting equilib-
rium shows that similar quote dynamics can be observed when public traders arrive at the
market randomly. However, they exclude the possibility of submitting limit orders at or
behind the best quote by their assumptions. Our equilibrium shows that traders reason-
ably submit such limit orders, which makes widening the spread faster than narrowing the
spread. Traders actually submit limit orders outside the spread. For example, Griﬃths
et al. (2000) report that the ratio of the number of limit orders placed outside the best
quotes relative to all orders is 13.16% (11.06%) for sell (buy) orders on the Toronto Stock
Exchange. Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) report that the ratio is 30.5% in the Island ECN.
5.3 The level of quotes
In an equilibrium under the one-period expiration, the ask submitted to an empty book
is higher than the bid submitted to an empty book as Proposition 1 shows. In a quote-
cutting equilibrium under the two-period expiration, similar property holds. However,
more aggressive quotes are also posted as the next proposition suggests.
Proposition 5 In a quote-cutting equilibrium, (1) the ﬁrst ask submitted to an empty
book, Af, is higher than the ﬁrst bid submitted to an empty book. (2) The most aggressive
ask submitted on the equilibrium path, Al, is lower than the most aggressive bid submitted
on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 5(2) shows that some bids exceed some asks on the equilibrium path because
of quote competition. Thus, an outside dealer can make a proﬁt if he buys an asset when
an ask is low and sells it when a bid is high. This proﬁtable opportunity would attract
dealers into limit order markets. We leave the investigation into dealing in limit order
markets to future research.9
Quotes posted in a book depend on the trader arrival. The following proposition
states that the relations between the trader arrival and the critical quotes are similar to
those under the one-period expiration.
Proposition 6 In a quote-cutting equilibrium, (1) Al, Au, Af, and Ah decrease in πs
given πb. The bid side is symmetric. (2) Al, Au, Af, and Ah increase in πb given πs. The
bid side is symmetric. (3) Suppose β = 1/2 and πs = πb = α/2. The asks Af and Al
decrease in α. Let a1 = 2(
√
2 − 1) ≅ 0.83. The asks Ah and Au decrease in α for α < a1
but increase in α for α > a1. The bid side is symmetric.
Propositions 6(1) and (2) correspond to Propositions 2(1) and (2), respectively. The asks
decrease when the share of sellers is large or the share of buyers is small. Proposition
6(3) considers the eﬀect of the trader arrival on quotes when sellers and buyers arrive
9Bloomﬁeld et al. (2005) experimentally show an endogenous liquidity provision in limit order markets.
17proportionally. The eﬀect under πs = πb is not simple like Proposition 2. When α is
higher and more traders arrive at the market, limit orders are more proﬁtable because of
a higher execution probability. In order to attract market orders, a trader has to submit
a more aggressive limit order. It follows that the asks Af and Al decrease in α. At the
same time, there is a counter eﬀect; the bids increase in α symmetrically; aggressive bids
reduce the expected utility of buyers; a less aggressive ask is required to attract MBs.
This counter eﬀect induces Ah and Au to increase in α if α is high.
It is not easy to calculate the expected spread in general because it depends on the
number of steps of one-tick quote-cutting, which depends on the tick size. However, we
conjecture that a higher trader arrival rate is related with a narrower spread similar to
Proposition 2(4). This is because Af is the most frequently observed ask and it decreases
in the trader arrival rate, as Proposition 6(3) states. For numerical examples, consider
the parameter values vH = 21, vL = 0, k = 1, and β = 1/2. For α = 1 > a1, the expected
spread is 14.3 for a quote-cutting equilibrium. For α = 2/3 < a1, there is a numerical
example of an equilibrium whose expected spread is 15.8. These examples are consistent
with our conjecture.
The execution probability of limit orders can be higher when they expire in two periods
rather than one. Such a high execution probability induces traders to submit aggressive
limit orders to call for market orders. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst ask submitted to an empty book, Af,
and the ﬁrst bid submitted to an empty book under the two-period expiration is smaller
than the diﬀerence between the ask Ar and the bid Br under the one-period expiration.
Proposition 7 implies that the expected spread is narrower if limit orders expire in longer
periods. In Section 6, we will show numerical examples consistent with this conjecture.
5.4 The size of holes
Some empirical studies observe holes in books. A quote-cutting equilibrium oﬀers an
explanation for the existence of holes, which emerge in the book by quote jumps. There
are three types of holes on the ask side in a quote-cutting equilibrium: (1) a hole with the
size of Au − Al when the most aggressive ask Al is submitted to the book as in period 5,
Figure 1; (2) a hole with the size of Ah−Al when the least aggressive ask Ah is submitted
behind the best ask as in period 6, Figure 1; and (3) a hole with the size of Ah−Af when
cyclical quote dynamics resume again from Af as in period 7, Figure 1. The ﬁrst hole is
observed more frequently than the others.
The size of holes depends not on the tick size but on the trader arrival because quote
jumps are caused by the discontinuity of the execution probability. The next proposition
concerns the relation between the size of holes and the trader arrival.
18Proposition 8 Suppose β = 1/2 and πs = πb = α/2. The sizes of the holes Au −Al and






6 − 6 ≅ 0.50. The size of the hole Ah − Al
increases in α for α > a2 and decreases in α for α < a2. The price range of one-tick
quote-cutting Af − Au decreases in α. The bid side is symmetric.
Discontinuity in execution probability creates quote jumps and holes. If traders arrive at
the market more frequently, discontinuity is greater, and the size of a hole is larger. When
the best ask is Au, a seller undercuts it to a larger degree to deter further quote-cutting
under the higher trader arrival rate because its gain in the execution probability is larger.
This order submission widens the hole with the size Au − Al. Though the hole with the
size Ah − Al under the small trader arrival rate is an exception, such a hole is observed
less frequently.
5.5 Allocational Eﬃciency
A queuing equilibrium can attain the most eﬃcient allocation as the following proposition
states.
Proposition 9 Suppose that limit orders expire in two periods and that the discount
factor of every trader is one. (1) A queuing equilibrium attains the most eﬃcient allocation
if a trader submits a market order to the book with limit orders on the opposite side of
the book on the equilibrium path. (2) A quote-cutting equilibrium cannot attain the most
eﬃcient allocation. (3) For a quote-cutting equilibrium, the allocation is more eﬃcient if
the tick size is larger.
In this model, whenever a seller meets a buyer, there is a gain of trade because their
valuations are diﬀerent. The probability of a transaction perfectly correlates with the
allocational eﬃciency. When traders are matched on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis, the
allocation is most eﬃcient. In Table 2, a queuing equilibrium of Eq 3 attains the most
eﬃcient allocation because a seller (buyer) submits a MS (MB) to the book with LBs
(LSs) on the equilibrium path. In contrast, Eq 2 is a queuing equilibrium, but does not
attain the most eﬃcient allocation because a seller submits not a MS but a LS at 2 to
the book with a LB at 1 submitted one period ago.
Queuing enhances eﬃciency whereas quote-cutting reduces eﬃciency because quote-
cutting deprives an early trader of a chance for a transaction. If a trader submits a limit
order at or behind the market, such ineﬃciency does not occur. Thus, the large tick size
can enhance allocational eﬃciency for a quote-cutting equilibrium by making one-tick
quote-cutting take fewer steps as Proposition 9(3) states.
5.6 A hybrid of queuing and quote-cutting
As discussed in Section 3.3, the large tick size can make optimal strategies multiple,
creating multiple equilibria. This subsection shows some numerical examples of hybrid
19equilibria of queuing and quote-cutting under the large tick size.
Consider the parameter values of vH = 7, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2 under
the two-period expiration. In an equilibrium, sellers consecutively submit LSs at 4, 3,
2, then queue at 2. This equilibrium displays both quote-cutting and queuing but not
rebound of quotes.
Under the above parameter values, there is another equilibrium where sellers sub-
sequently submit LSs at 2, 4, and the same cycle starts again from 2. The ﬁrst ask
submitted to an empty book is the most aggressive ask on the equilibrium path. In this
equilibrium, the best ask remains at 2, and a hole emerges and persists behind the best
ask. We can observe the hole statically even though cyclic order submissions are creating
the hole.
6 Expiration periods of limit orders
We have assumed that limit orders expire in one or two periods after their submission. In
this section, we discuss how expiration periods of limit orders aﬀect cyclic quote dynamics
and order composition by numerical examples.
6.1 Cyclic quote dynamics
A quote-cutting equilibrium under the two-period expiration has cyclic quote dynamics.
The following examples show that a cycle is observed even if limit orders expire in longer
periods. Consider the parameter values vH = 14, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2.
Under the two-period expiration, there is an equilibrium where sellers submit LSs at 8,
7, 4, and 10 consecutively, and the next seller restarts the same cycle by submitting a
LS at 8. Under the three-period expiration, there is an equilibrium where sellers submit
LSs at 8, 7, 6, 5, and 3 consecutively, and the same cycle starts over from 8. Under the
four-period expiration, there is an equilibrium where sellers submit LSs at 7, 6, 5, 4, and
3 consecutively, the next ask rebounds to 8, and the same cycle starts again.
The above examples suggest that, as limit orders survive over longer periods, quotes
become more aggressive. This is consistent with Proposition 7 regarding one- and two-
period expiration. In addition, the size of the hole at the most aggressive quote is expected
to be smaller. Our reasoning is as follows. If limit orders survive over longer periods, their
potential execution probabilities are higher, and the expected utilities from limit orders
are greater. Thus, to call for market orders, traders need to submit more aggressive limit
orders. Because limit orders already yield the lower expected utility, there is less room
for quote jumps, which reduces the size of holes.
206.2 Order composition
To investigate order composition numerically, consider parameter values vH = 14, vL = 0,
k = 1, and β = 1/2. Table 3 reports the expected spread and order composition for the
trader arrival rate α of 1/3, 2/3, and 1 under the two-, three- and four-period expiration of
limit orders. We classify market orders as “Market order,” limit orders undercutting the
best quote by more than one tick as “Undercutting by more than one tick,” limit orders
undercutting the best quote by one tick as “Undercutting by one tick,” limit orders at
the best quote as “At the market,” and limit orders behind the best quote as “Behind
the market.” We classify the other orders, limit orders submitted to an empty book, as
“Empty” because our traders frequently submit such orders. For all equilibria, strategies
for sellers and buyers are symmetric. Thus, the order composition for sell orders, buy
orders, and total orders is the same.
Table 3 shows that the share of market orders and limit orders submitted behind the
market increases as the trader arrival rate or the expiration periods increase. One reason
is that the book tends not to be empty under the larger trader arrival or under the longer
expiration periods. On the other hand, the order compositions for α = 1 under the three-
period expiration indicates that the share of limit orders undercutting the best quote does
not necessarily increase in the expiration periods. The longer expiration periods make
quotes more aggressive, which leaves no room for further quote-cutting.
In this model, the share of market orders is the same as the transaction probability,
and is perfectly correlated with allocational eﬃciency. Because the share of market orders
and the share of limit orders submitted behind the market correlate, both of them can be
indicators of allocational eﬃciency. In addition, the table shows that the expected spread
negatively correlates with the share of market orders. Thus, the size of spread can also be
a measure of allocational eﬃciency. Two points to note are that queuing is more eﬃcient
as Proposition 9 states and that there can be equilibrium yielding less eﬃcient allocation
with narrower spreads because of multiplicity of equilibria.
6.3 Other types of equilibria
In a quote-cutting equilibrium, quotes do not jump in the middle of one-tick quote-cutting,
and a trader does not submit a limit order behind the best quote until the best quote
reaches the most aggressive level. The following example shows that these features are not
necessarily true if limit orders expire in longer periods partly because of the multiplicity
of equilibria due to the positive tick size.
Consider the parameter values vH = 14, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2. These
parameter values are the same as those in Section 6.1, and there is an equilibrium with
cyclic quote dynamics. Under the three-period expiration, there is another equilibrium
where sellers submit LSs at 9, 7, 6, 5, 4, 8, 3, 8, 7, 6, 5, and 4 consecutively, then return
to the ﬁrst 8, and the same cycle starts over again. During quote competition, the best
21ask jumps from 9 to 7. In addition, quotes rebound from 4 to 8 even though 4 is not the
most aggressive ask.
Foucault et al. (2005) demonstrate by their Corollary 4 that quotes jump more likely
when the spread is wide under the large share of patient traders, while quotes jump more
likely when the spread is narrow under the large share of impatient traders. Our results
are consistent with those of Foucault et al. (2005) if the length of expiration of limit orders
can be considered to represent the degree of patience of traders because a quote-cutting
equilibrium displays quote jumps under the narrow spread while the above example dis-
plays quote jumps under the wide spread. Their results depend on the assumptions that
sellers and buyers arrive at the market alternately with certainty, that traders cannot sub-
mit limit orders at or behind the market, that traders are heterogeneous in patience, and
that limit orders survive deﬁnitely. A quote-cutting equilibrium demonstrates that quotes
jump even if their assumptions are relaxed. In particular, our results clarify that quote
competition among homogeneous traders can cause quotes to jump. The heterogeneity
of patience introduces another eﬀect as we will discuss in the next section.
With respect to equilibria under the longer expiration periods, we do not investigate
them formally but merely show some numerical examples. Are cyclic quote dynamics
observed even under the longer expiration periods if the tick size is small enough? Under
which long or short expiration periods does queueing more likely occur? These questions
remain to be pursued.
7 The eﬀect of patience
We have assumed that the discount factor of every trader is one in order to focus on quote
competition. This section discusses the eﬀect of patience to compare our results with those
of Foucault et al. (2005) who assume that traders are heterogeneous in patience. First,
Section 7.1 examines how patience aﬀects spreads when traders are homogeneous in pa-
tience. In Section 7.2, we investigate how heterogeneous patience aﬀects order submission
strategies and spreads. Section 7.3 discusses implications.
To focus on the eﬀect of patience by putting quote competition aside, we assume that
limit orders expire in one period and that the expected utility for a seller is
V (s,x,ω,π,x) =
{
δΦ(s,A,ω,π,x)(A − vL) if x is a LS at A
B∗(ω) − vL if x is a MS
where δ is the discount factor. The expected utility for a buyer is assumed to be sym-
metric. We assume that traders diﬀer in patience in the following way.
Assumption 1: A trader is either a patient seller ps, an impatient seller is, a patient buyer
pb, or an impatient buyer ib. The discount factor of patient traders, ps and pb, is δp while
the discount factor of impatient traders, is and ib, is δi. We assume 0 < δi < δp ≤ 1. The
share of patient traders is γ ∈ [0,1]. In addition, limit orders expire in one period after
22their submission, while limit orders can be contingent on a price of a real number, and
β = 1/2.
Under Assumption 1, a trader is a patient seller with probability αγ/2, an impatient
seller with probability α(1 − γ)/2, a patient buyer with probability αγ/2, an impatient
buyer with probability α(1 − γ)/2, and no trader otherwise. We consider γ = 1 as the
homogeneous case. Theorem 4 in the Appendix presents an equilibrium under Assumption
1.
7.1 Homogeneous patience
If traders are less patient, the expected utility from a limit order is smaller; the less
aggressive limit order is suﬃcient to extract a market order; and the spread is wider. The
next proposition states this relation.
Proposition 10 Under Assumption 1 along with γ = 1, the smaller the discount factor
δp is, the larger the expected spread is.
Proposition 10 corresponds to Proposition 2(3). In this case, the ask Ap and the bid Bp
submitted on the equilibrium path satisfy the following equations:
vH − Ap = δpα(vH − Bp)/2, (3)
Bp − vL = δpα(Ap − vL)/2. (4)
If δp = 1, these equations are the same as Equations (1) and (2) under πs = πb = α/2.
Equations (3) and (4) indicate that the execution risk represented by α and the cost of
execution delay represented by δp have exactly the same eﬀect on quotes in this model.
7.2 Heterogeneous patience
In an equilibrium under heterogeneous patience, if the degree of heterogeneity in patience
is large, only impatient traders submit market orders on the equilibrium path. The
following corollary stemming from Theorem 4 in the Appendix states this property. Let
ˆ α = 2γ/(1 − γ)/(δp − δi).
Corollary 2: Under Assumption 1, if α < ˆ α, every trader submits a market order to the
book with a limit order on the equilibrium path. If α > ˆ α, only an impatient trader
submits a market order to the book with a limit order on the equilibrium path. If α = ˆ α,
there are multiple equilibria.
If γ is large or if δp − δi is small, α < ˆ α. In this case, heterogeneity of patience is small,
and tradings are similar to tradings under homogeneous patience. On the other hand, if
γ is small or if δp − δi is large, α > ˆ α. In this case, heterogeneity of patience is large,
23and a trader submits a less aggressive limit order to which only impatient traders submit
market orders.
The reason is that impatient traders are desperate to trade and are thus inclined to
submit market orders. Hence, a seller has two options in submitting a LS, a conservative
LS to trade only with impatient buyers and an aggressive LS to trade both with patient
buyers and impatient buyers. If the share of impatient buyers 1 − γ is large, the cost in
the execution probability to give up trading with patient buyers is small. If the diﬀerence
of patience δp − δi is large, the beneﬁt in price of submitting a conservative LS is large
because more impatient buyers submit market orders to less aggressive LSs. Thus, if
α > ˆ α, a seller chooses a conservative LS, and the next patient buyer submits not a MB
but a conservative LB. Patient buyers can wait and let transaction opportunities pass in
order to trade at a more favorable price with a future impatient seller.
Large heterogeneity in patience makes quotes less aggressive and widens the expected
spread as the next proposition states. Let ˆ γ = α(δp − δi)/(2 + α(δp − δi)). α > ˆ α if and
only if γ < ˆ γ.
Proposition 11 Under Assumption 1, (1) suppose that the parameter values except α
are constant and that ˆ α < 1. The expected spread under α = ˆ α − ϵ is strictly narrower
than the expected spread under α = ˆ α + ϵ for small ϵ > 0. (2) Suppose the parameter
values except γ are constant. The expected spread under γ > ˆ γ is narrower than the
expected spread under γ < ˆ γ.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 11(1). The ﬁgure depicts the relation between the
trader arrival rate α and the expected spread under vH = 1, vL = 0, β = 1/2, δp = 1,
and δi = 0.2. The solid line, broken line, and dash-dotted line depict the expected spread
under γ = 0.1, γ = 0.25, and γ = 0.6, respectively. Basically, the higher trader arrival
rate relates with the narrower spread as Proposition 2(4) states. Heterogeneity of patience
introduces a large change in the expected spread at ˆ α. In addition, because ˆ α increases
in γ, a large change occurs at the higher α if γ is higher as Figure 2 shows. These results
are similar to numerical examples of Table 3 in Foucault et al. (2005). For empirical
implications, we expect that the spreads can change drastically in some situations if
heterogeneity in patience is discrete and large.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 11(2). The ﬁgure depicts the relation between the
share of patient traders γ and the expected spread under vH = 1, vL = 0, α = 1, β = 1/2,
δp = 1, and δi = 0.2. The points A, B, and C correspond to the respective points A, B,
and C in Figure 2. The ﬁgure shows that as the proportion of patient traders increases,
the spread narrows drastically at ˆ γ.
If the share of patient traders γ is larger than the critical level ˆ γ, traders submit
aggressive limit orders in order not to miss any transaction opportunity. On the other
hand, if γ is smaller than ˆ γ, traders submit less aggressive limit orders, which widens the
spread and, reduces allocational eﬃciency as the next proposition states.
24Proposition 12 Under Assumption 1, suppose the parameter values except γ are con-
stant. The transaction probability is greater under γ ∈ (ˆ γ,1] than under γ ∈ (0, ˆ γ).
Thus, the narrow spread indicates more eﬃcient allocation under heterogeneity in patience
without quote competition.
7.3 Discussion
We have separately analyzed the eﬀect of quote competition and the eﬀect of heterogeneity
in patience. Foucault et al. (2005) have analyzed both eﬀects simultaneously. They
deﬁne that the market is more resilient if “the probability that the spread reverts to its
competitive level before the next transaction occurs” is larger. It means that the market
is resilient if the spread reaches the most aggressive level rapidly. They show that the
market is more resilient and the spread is narrower if the share of patient traders is larger.
Figure 3 depicts the relation between the share of patient trader γ and the expected
spread without the eﬀect of quote competition. In contrast to the prediction of Foucault
et al. (2005), the ﬁgure does not show the negative relation. The spread is very wide
under the middle range of γ like Point B in the ﬁgure. This inconsistency suggests that
resiliency for the middle share of patient traders depends not only on heterogeneity in
patience but also on quote competition. If the shares of patient traders are nearly equal to
the share of impatient traders, and if limit orders survive longer periods, patient traders
would compete in quote for market orders, which makes the market resilient and the
spread narrow.
On the other hand, as Proposition 3 implies, traders do not compete in price but tend
to queue at the same price if they expect plentiful market orders. Given α, if γ is small, a
certain amount of market orders are submitted by impatient traders. If γ is large, market
orders are plentiful because every trader submits a market order. Thus, for small and
large γ like Points A and C but not for medium γ like Point B in Figure 3, patient traders
do not ﬁercely compete in quote. This suggests that not quote competition but rather
heterogeneous patience can be important for resiliency and spreads under small and large
γ.
As a whole, our analysis suggests that heterogeneity in patience is an important factor
for weak and strong resiliency and quote competition is an important factor for medium
resiliency. These two factors can cause the negative relation between the share of patient
traders and resiliency as Foucault et al. (2005) predict. This article investigates how
homogeneous traders compete in quotes to focus on quote competition. We leave a study
on how heterogeneous traders compete in quotes under longer expiration periods of limit
orders for future research.10
10Goettler et al. (2005) investigate the eﬀect of heterogeneity in valuation. In our framework, hetero-
geneity in valuation and heterogeneity in patience yield similar equilibrium at least under the following
assumption. Let the valuation of sellers be vL −ρ∆, and let the valuation of buyers be vH +ρ∆. For each
258 Empirical implications
Now, we summarize empirical implications on quote jumps and holes, and spreads. At
the end of this section, we discuss the eﬀect of a tick size reduction.
8.1 Quote jumps and holes
Quote dynamics in a quote-cutting equilibrium show that spreads can change dynamically,
and that there can be no single equilibrium value of the spread. During quote-cutting,
small quote improvements occur in succession at ﬁrst, followed by a large quote jump.
The sizes of quote jumps are larger when the trader arrival rate is higher. In contrast,
widening the spread takes few steps, and is faster than narrowing the spread.
Several empirical studies have observed holes in the book. We predict that some
holes are related with quote jumps. The size of a hole is large if the trader arrival rate is
high. Holes are observed more frequently just behind the best quote if traders can quickly
respond to the transition of the book.
A tick size aﬀects the number of steps of one-tick quote-cutting, and does not aﬀect
the size of quote jumps and holes. However, how often holes are observed depends on the
tick size. If the tick size is large, quote jumps can be observed less frequently because the
extent of a quote jump can match the tick size. On the other hand, if the tick size is too
small, quote jumps are observed less frequently because of the long steps involved in one-
tick quote-cutting. Thus, we expect that quote jumps and holes are observed frequently
for a certain tick size.
As a consequence of holes, distributions of quotes and transaction prices can be fat-
tailed. For the example of a quote-cutting equilibrium depicted in Figure 1, transactions
at Al = 5 or Ah = 15 take place though transactions by MBs at the adjacent asks 6,
7, 13, and 14 do not take place because sellers do not submit LSs at these prices. The
kurtosis of transaction prices for this example is 4.9, which is higher than that for the
normal distribution, i.e., 3.
Another possible implication of quote jumps relates to quote clustering. Harris (1991)
and Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2004), among others, observe that prices in securities
markets tend to cluster at prices whose ﬁnal digits are 0 or 5. Suppose that for some
reason there are some traders who prefer prices divisible by 5. Other traders expect that
limit orders at quotes ending at 0 will be submitted in the future. When the ﬁnal digit
of the current ask is 5, a seller would submit a LS at an ask ending at 4 to enjoy the high
price in spite of expecting future quote-cutting. On the other hand, if the ﬁnal digit of
the current ask is 2, a seller would skip one tick and submit a LS at an ask ending at 0 to
obtain the higher execution probability by submitting the clustering price himself. These
seller and buyer, a trader is either a low type with ρ = 0 and a high type with ρ > 0. The share of the
low type traders is γ. Under this setting, a low (high) type trader corresponds to a patient (impatient)
trader.
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2, and 1, and to cluster at 5 followed by 9, 8, 7, and 6. A symmetric argument predicts
that the ﬁnal digits of bids cluster at 0 followed by 6, 7, 8, and 9, and also cluster at 5
followed by 1, 2, 3, and 4. Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2004) present data partially
consistent with this prediction in their Table 4 (but for the NASDAQ and the New York
Stock Exchange rather than for pure limit order markets).
8.2 The spreads
If the tick size is small, the spread changes dynamically, and the average spread is narrow
for frequently traded stocks. If the tick size is large and if the stocks are traded frequently,
the spread can be stable because of queuing. Moreover, transactions can take place at a
single price like transactions in a call auction. In such a case, the spread is meaningless
for the measure of transaction costs.
If traders diﬀer in patience discretely, the size of spreads can change discontinuously
in relative to the change in the trader arrival rate. According to Foucault et al. (2005),
if traders become more impatient toward the market closing, we may be able to observe
the discontinuous increase in the spread near the market closing.
8.3 A reduction in the tick size
Using numerical examples, we discuss the eﬀect of a tick size reduction on spreads. In
summary, our model predicts that a large reduction in the tick size would expand spreads
by extending the convergence of quotes to the most aggressive level. This widens the
average spread and undermine allocational eﬃciency. These eﬀects are also discussed in
Foucault et al. (2005). In addition, we show that if the extent of a tick-size reduction is
small, the change of spreads can be ambiguous due to multiplicity of equilibria.
Consider the parameter values vH = 21, vL = 0, α = 1, and β = 1/2. Table 4
presents the expected spread and order composition for six equilibria. The classiﬁcation
of order composition is the same as in Table 3. Eq 5 is a quote-cutting equilibrium under
k = 1 whose quote dynamics Figure 1 depicts. Eq 6 is a quote-cutting equilibrium under
k = 1/2. We work out equilibrium strategies numerically for k = 7 and k = 3. Eq 1, Eq
2, and Eq 3 are equilibria under k = 7 whose strategies are presented in Table 2.11 Eq
4 is an equilibrium under k = 3. Theorem 2 states that a queuing equilibrium can exist
under k = 7 and k = 3 but cannot exist under k = 1 and k = 1/2. Indeed, Eq 2 and Eq
3 are queuing equilibria under k = 7.12
11Table 2 presents equilibria under vH = 3 and k = 1 while Table 4 presents equilibria under vH = 21
and k = 7.
12For example, Biais et al. (1995) report that, in the Paris Bourse, the share of limit orders undercutting
the best quote to all orders is 17.3%, the share of limit orders at the market is 9.6%, and the share of
limit orders behind the market is 14.4%. These shares are similar to those for Eq 1 in Table 4.
27As for the expected spread, Table 4 shows that the smaller tick size is related to the
wider expected spread if the tick size is smaller than 3. The ﬁne pricing grid delays the
convergence of quotes to the most aggressive level, which widens the expected spread.
Thus, a tick size reduction would expand the spread if the tick size is already small.
On the other hand, if the tick size is large, the eﬀect of a tick size reduction on the
spread can be ambiguous. In Table 4, the expected spread is 13.8, 13.2, or 10.2 under
k = 7, against 13.6 under k = 3. Thus, the eﬀect of the reduction from k = 7 to k = 3
depends on which equilibrium is attained before the reduction. The results of an empirical
investigation by Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) in the Paris Bourse are consistent with
this ambiguity.
Though the eﬀect of a tick size reduction is ambiguous, an interesting case is the
transition from Eq 1 under k = 7 to Eq 4 under k = 3. From Eq 1 to Eq 4, the
share of limit orders undercutting the best quote increases from 16.2% to 27.5%, the
expected spread decreases from 13.8 to 13.6, and the share of limit orders at the market
decreases from 8.1% to 0%. Thus, more frequent quote-cutting is related to a narrower
spread and smaller depth. This relation is observed by Bacidore (1997) in the Toronto
Stock Exchange, by Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) in the Paris Bourse, and by Chung,
Charoenwong, and Ding (2004) in the New York Stock Exchange.
Goettler et al. (2005) argue that a tick size reduction can be welfare improving, though
their arguments are based on numerical examples and the driving force of their results
is not clear. Proposition 9(3) predicts that if traders are homogeneous, a large tick size
reduction can undermine allocational eﬃciency by depriving the transaction opportunity
from traders who arrive at the market early. On the other hand, if traders diﬀer greatly
in patience or valuation, a tick size reduction can improve welfare. Large heterogeneity
in patience among traders widens the spread and reduces allocational eﬃciency as Propo-
sitions 11 and 12 suggests. A tick size reduction can promote quote-cutting, and traders
submit more aggressive orders, which can improve eﬃciency. We conjecture that a tick
size reduction enhances allocational eﬃciency if heterogeneity among traders is large and
if a tick size reduction is suﬃcient.
9 Concluding remarks
We investigate how traders submit orders to limit order markets and how quotes change in
equilibrium by assuming that limit orders expire in certain periods after their submission.
This assumption simpliﬁes the state space of the book, whereas it does not eliminate
competition among limit orders.
We present cyclic quote dynamics with quote jumps. A trader undercuts the best
extant quote by more than one tick if such an order can prevent future traders from
undercutting it further, because its gain in execution probability compensates for its cost
in price. When the book has aggressive limit orders, a trader may submit a limit order
28behind the market because its gain in price pays for its loss in execution probability.
These order submission strategies cause holes to emerge in the book. On the other hand,
if the tick size is large, traders can queue at the same quote because the cost in price of
quote-cutting is high.
Our model yields the following original insight on limit order markets. (1) Quote
jumps can create holes at the most aggressive quote, and the sizes of holes are large if
the trader arrival rate is high. (2) If holes are frequently observed, distributions of quotes
and transaction prices can be fat-tailed. (3) Limit orders submitted behind the market
are reasonable, and such orders make widening the spread faster than narrowing it. (4)
Queuing of limit orders can be observed if the tick size is large and the trader arrival rate
is high. (5) The eﬀect of a tick size reduction on spreads can be ambiguous because of
multiplicity of equilibria. (6) If traders are largely heterogeneous in patience, the spread is
wide and allocation is not eﬃcient. Investigating the empirical relevance of these features
for limit order markets is an interesting topic for future empirical studies.
Finally, we end this article with a discussion of two issues left for future research.
We assume that the size of an order is one and that limit orders expire automatically.
An important question is how traders compete in price if they submit multiple orders
with cancellation and resubmission. However, in such a situation, the decision problem
of traders is dynamic, and the model has diﬃculty in solving it. Another question is how
asymmetric information aﬀects order submission strategies and the shape of the book.
What information the book has and what information traders try to extract from the
book are interesting questions.
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In this appendix, we ﬁrst describe some notations to specify the model. Next, we deﬁne a
queuing equilibrium in Deﬁnition 1 together with remarks, and prove Theorem 2. After
that, we explain asks in a quote-cutting equilibrium in Theorem 3, followed by the deﬁni-
tions of variables, Theorem 3 itself, along with some relevant remarks, and then its proof.
Next, we present Theorem 4 describing an equilibrium under heterogeneity in patience,
and prove it. Finally, we prove the propositions.
A.1 Some notations
First, to describe the model speciﬁcally, let the decision process of a trader in period τ
be divided into two stages. At stage 1, he decides whether or not he will submit a market
order. If he submits a market order, period τ terminates and it passes to the next period.
If he does not, he proceeds to stage 2 and decides whether or not he will submit a limit
order. After his submission of a limit order or no order, period τ terminates and it passes
to the next period.
Next we deﬁne the set of states of the book under the two-period expiration. When
limit orders expire in two periods, the book has at most two limit orders. The possible
limit orders in the book in period τ are a LS submitted in τ − 2, a LS in τ − 1, a LB in
τ − 1, and a LB in τ − 2. Let A−τ′ (B−τ′) be the quote of a LS (LB) submitted in τ′
periods before τ. ys
−2 (ys
−1) takes the value A−2 (A−1) if a LS is submitted in τ −2 (τ −1)
and if it is still listed in the book in τ, but takes n otherwise. Similarly, let yb
−2 (yb
−1)
take B−2 (B−1) if a LB submitted in τ − 2 (τ − 1) is in the book in τ, but n otherwise.




−1). The set of states
of the book Ω is
Ω = {(n,n,n,n), (n,n,n,A−1), (n,n,A−2,n), (n,B−1,n,n), (B−2,n,n,n),
(n,n,A−2,A−1), (B−2,B−1,n,n) : A−1,A−2,B−1,B−2 ∈ Nk ∩ (vL,vH)}∪
{(B−2,n,n,A−1), (n,B−1,A−2,n),: A−1,A−2,B−1,B−2 ∈ Nk ∩ (vL,vH),
B−2 < A−1,B−1 < A−2}.
We restrict asks and bids in (vL,vH) because traders never choose the other quotes in
equilibrium as footnote 5 explains. In addition, from Ω we exclude books in which the
best bid exceeds the best ask because marketable limit orders are immediately executed
under our trading rule.
To indicate traders, let t0 be a trader in a given period. ts and tb denote a seller
and a buyer in the following period, respectively. A seller and a buyer after ts (tb) are
denoted by tss (tbs) and tsb (tbb), respectively. If no trader arrives following t0, a seller
and a buyer in the two periods ahead of t0 are denoted by tns and tnb. Figure 4 illustrates
these notations.
30A.2 Deﬁnition of queuing equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1: Let Aq be the ask at which a seller submits a LS to an empty book. Similarly,
let Bq be the bid at which a buyer submits a LB to an empty book. We call an equilibrium
satisfying the following (q1) to (q8) a queuing equilibrium under the two-period expiration
of limit orders.
(q1) A seller submits a LS at Aq to (n,n,Aq,Aq).
(q2) A seller submits a LS at A′ such as A′ ≥ Aq to (n,n,A,Aq) where A < Aq.
(q3) A buyer submits a MB to (n,n,A,ys
−1) where A ≤ Aq and ∀ys
−1.
(q4) Let Am be
Am = max
A∈Nk
A s.t. vH − A ≥ πs(1 + z + πb)(vH − Bq).
When Am > Aq, a seller submits a LS at A′ such as A′ < Am to (n,n,Aq,Am) and a
buyer submits a MB to (n,n,Am,n).
(q5) A buyer submits a LB at Bq to (Bq,Bq,n,n).
(q6) A buyer submits a LB at B′ such as B′ ≤ Bq to (B,Bq,n,n) where B > Bq.
(q7) A seller submits a MS to (B,yb
−1n,n) where B ≥ Bq and ∀yb
−1.
(q8) Let Bm be
Bm = min
B∈Nk
B s.t. B − vL ≥ πb(1 + z + πs)(Aq − vL).
When Bm < Bq, a buyer submits a LB at B′ such as B′ > Bm to (Bq,Bm,n,n) and a
seller submits a MS to (Bm,n,n,n).
Remark 1: The conditions from (q1) to (q4) are those for sellers to queue at Aq. The
conditions from (q5) to (q8) are those for buyers to queue at Bq. Though the conditions
characterizing queuing itself are (q1) and (q5), we require the other conditions in proving
Theorem 2. We explain (q2), (q3), and (q4) in the following Remarks 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. We discuss the necessity and suﬃciency of these conditions in Remarks 5
and 6, respectively.
Remark 2: The condition (q2) demands that a seller does not follow the quote-cutting that
occurred two periods ago. Under (q1), (q2) is not satisﬁed only if the optimal strategy for
a seller facing (n,n,n,Aq) is not unique because the optimal strategy for a seller facing
(n,n,ys
−2,Aq) is the same for ∀ys
−2. There are numerical examples of equilibria satisfying
(q1) but not (q2) under the large tick size.
Remark 3: The condition (q3) demands that a buyer submits a MB to (n,n,Aq,Aq). In
general, a seller calls for MBs by submitting an aggressive order. However, if the tick size
is large, the cost in price to submit aggressive orders is so high that a seller reluctantly
permits the next buyer not to submit a MB, causing (q3) not to be satisﬁed. There are
numerical examples of equilibria where (q3) are not satisﬁed under the large tick size.
31Remark 4: The condition (q4) demands that a seller submits a LS at Aq if the previous
seller submits a LS at Am such as Am > Aq. Under (q5) and (q7), buyers queue at Bq
and sellers submit MSs to the queue. Thus, a buyer facing an empty book obtains the
expected utility πs(1+z+πb)(vH−Bq), which is the highest for buyers on the equilibrium
path. We deﬁne Am as the maximum ask for a seller t0 to trade with the buyers tbb and
tnb by giving them this highest expected utility. The condition (q4) also requires that the
buyers actually submit MBs to a LS at Am. There are numerical examples of equilibria
where (q4) are not satisﬁed under the large tick size.
Remark 5: The conditions from (q1) to (q8) are not necessary for transactions to take
place only at Aq or Bq. There are numerical examples of equilibria where transactions
take place at Aq or Bq even though they do not satisfy every condition of the deﬁnition.
Our conjecture is that (q2)-(q4) and (q6)-(q8) are satisﬁed if the tick size is smaller than
a certain level and that Theorem 2 or its modiﬁed version holds for a queuing equilibrium
deﬁned by only (q1) and (q5). It is an open question whether our conditions specifying
queuing equilibrium can be relaxed.
Remark 6: The conditions from (q1) to (q8) are not suﬃcient for transactions to take
place only at Aq or Bq. For example, the deﬁnition does not require that a seller submit
a LS at Aq to (n,n,Aq,n) and (n,n,n,Aq), or that he submits a MS or a LS at Aq to
(n,Bq,n,n). The omission of these requirements enables our queuing equilibria to allow
transactions at diﬀerent prices from Aq or Bq. There are numerical examples of such
equilibria. Even so, we do not include these requirements in our deﬁnition since we do
not use them in proving Theorem 2.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we consider the conditions where a seller has no
incentive to submit a LS behind Aq. Second, we consider the conditions where a seller
has no incentive to undercut Aq. Combining these conditions yields Theorem 2.
First, we examine the conditions where a seller has no incentive to submit a limit order
behind Aq. Suppose Am > Aq. A seller t0 facing (n,n,n,Aq) gets the expected utility
πb(Aq − vL) by submitting a LS at Aq because his LS is matched with MBs of tsb, tnb,
and tbb due to (q1) and (q3). Similarly, t0 gets the expected utility πb(z + πb)(Am − vL)
by submitting a LS at Am due to (q3) and (q4). A seller prefers Aq to Am if
πb(Aq − vL) ≥ πb(z + πb)(Am − vL). (5)
If Am > Aq, a queuing equilibrium satisﬁes Condition (5). If Am ≤ Aq, Condition (5) is
always satisﬁed. Thus, Condition (5) is satisﬁed for every queuing equilibrium.
By the deﬁnition of Am, πs(1 + z + πb)(vH − Bq) > vH − Am − k. Applying this to
Condition (5) yields
Aq − vL > (1 − πs)(∆ − k) − πs(1 − πs)(2 − πs)(vH − Bq). (6)
32The symmetric condition for a buyer is
vH − Bq > (1 − πb)(∆ − k) − πb(1 − πb)(2 − πb)(Aq − vL). (7)
Every queuing equilibrium satisﬁes Conditions (6) and (7).
Next, we examine the conditions where a seller has no incentive to undercut Aq. There
can be four cases according to whether or not successive quote-cutting occurs after one
quote-cutting: (1) successive quote-cutting occurs on neither the ask nor bid side. (2)
successive quote-cutting occurs on both the ask and bid side. (3) successive quote-cutting
occurs only on the ask side. (4) successive quote-cutting occurs only on the bid side.
In any case, a seller facing the book (n,n,ys
−2,A1) for ∀ys
−2 and A1 ∈ (vL,Aq] gets the
expected utility πb(Aq − vL) by submitting a LS at Aq because of (q1), (q2), and (q3).
Case 1: Suppose there is no successive quote-cutting after one quote-cutting. If a
seller t0 facing (n,n,n,Aq) submits a LS at A such as A < Aq and if ts does not undercut
Aq, t0 gets the expected utility πb(1 + z + πs)(A − vL) due to (q3). The optimal ask in
this case is A = Aq − k. Thus, t0 does not undercut Aq but queues at Aq if
πb(Aq − vL) ≥ πb(1 + z + πs)(Aq − k − vL).
This condition is transformed to
Aq ≤ vL + (2 − πb)k/(1 − πb). (8)
The symmetric condition for a buyer not to undercut Bq is
Bq ≥ vH − (2 − πs)k/(1 − πs). (9)
The queuing equilibrium of Case 1 satisﬁes Conditions (6), (7), (8), and (9). Accord-
ingly, if there is no Aq and Bq satisfying these four conditions, a queuing equilibrium does
not exist. There is no Aq and Bq satisfying these four conditions if
Ax − vL ≤ (1 − πs)(∆ − k) − πs(1 − πs)(2 − πs)(vH − Bx) (10)
or
vH − Bx ≤ (1 − πb)(∆ − k) − πb(1 − πb)(2 − πb)(Ax − vL) (11)
are satisﬁed at Ax = vL+(2−πb)k/(1−πb) and Bx = vH −(2−πs)k/(1−πs). Condition
(10) is transformed to k ≤ ks
q∆, and Condition (11) is transformed to k ≤ kb
q∆. Thus,
there is no queuing equilibrium in Case 1 if k ≤ ks
q∆ or k ≤ kb
q∆.
Case 2: Suppose there is successive quote-cutting both on the ask and bid side. If
a seller t0 facing (n,n,n,Aq) submits a LS at Aq − n1k for some integer n1 ≥ 1 and if
the next seller ts undercuts the ask submitted by t0, t0 gets the expected utility πb(1 +
z)(Aq − n1k − vL) due to (q3). Thus, t0 queues at Aq if
πb(Aq − vL) ≥ πb(1 + z)(Aq − n1k − vL). (12)
33At the same time, there is a LS at Aq−n2k for some integer n2 > n1 which is not undercut
further. The execution probability of this LS is πb(1 + z + πs). A seller has an incentive
to submit this LS if
πb(1 + z + πs)(Aq − n2k − vL) ≥ πb(Aq − vL). (13)
For queuing at Aq, Condition (13) must be satisﬁed in equality, otherwise a seller
prefers Aq − n2k to Aq. For successive quote-cutting oﬀ the equilibrium path, Condition
(12) must be satisﬁed in equality, otherwise a seller prefers Aq−n2k to Aq−n1k. Moreover,
Condition (12) is satisﬁed in equality for n1 = 1 since
πb(1 + z)(Aq − k − vL) > πb(Aq − vL) = πb(1 + z)(Aq − n1k − vL)
if n1 > 1, which contradicts a seller’s preference for Aq over Aq − k.
If z = 0, Condition (12) with n1 = 1 is not satisﬁed in equality, implying there is no
queuing equilibrium in Case 2. If z > 0,
Aq = vL + (1 + z)k/z (14)
when Condition (12) with n1 = 1 is satisﬁed in equality. The symmetric condition for the
bid side is z > 0 and
Bq = vH − (1 + z)k/z. (15)
Thus, if z > 0, the queuing equilibrium in Case 2 satisﬁes Conditions (6), (7), (14), and
(15).
By the same argument as in Case 1, there is no queuing equilibrium in Case 2 under
z > 0 if Ax = vL + (1 + z)k/z and Bx = vH − (1 + z)k/z do not satisfy Conditions (10)
or (11). These conditions are transformed to
k/∆ ≤ z(1 − πs)/{(1 + z)(1 + πs(1 − πs)(2 − πs)) + z(1 − πs)} < ks
q
or
k/∆ ≤ z(1 − πb)/{(1 + z)(1 + πb(1 − πb)(2 − πb)) + z(1 − πb)} < kb
q.
Thus, there is no queuing equilibrium of Case 2 if k ≤ ks
q∆ or k ≤ kb
q∆.
Under Case 3, the queuing equilibrium satisﬁes Conditions (6), (7), (14), and (9). By
the same argument as in Case 1, there is no queuing equilibrium in Case 3 if k ≤ ks
q∆
or k ≤ kb
q∆. Case 4 is symmetric to Case 3. In brief, there is no queuing equilibrium if
k ≤ ks
q∆ or k ≤ kb
q∆. Q.E.D.
34A.4 Explanation of asks in Theorem 3
This subsection explains how and why the asks in a quote-cutting equilibrium are deﬁned.
The next subsection will oﬀer the formal deﬁnitions. The following explanation bases on
the proof of the optimality of strategies (s1) and (s5) in Theorem 3.
Suppose that a buyer facing an empty book obtains the expected utility ¯ vb
f by sub-
mitting an optimal LB. Though ¯ vb
f is exogenous for a while, we endogenize it in the end.
Let Ah = vH −¯ vb
f. Ah is the maximum ask satisfying a participation constraint of a buyer
vH − A ≥ ¯ vb
f. A seller t0 can trade with the buyers in two periods ahead, tsb, tnb, and tbb
by submitting a LS at A such as A ≤ Ah if the next traders do not interfere.
Suppose that a buyer tb facing the book with a LS of a seller t0 obtains the expected
utility ¯ vb
m by submitting not a MB but rather an optimal LB. Similar to ¯ vb
f, ¯ vb
m is exoge-
nous for a while, and is endogenized in the end. Let Af = vH − ¯ vb
m. A seller t0 can trade
with the next buyer tb by submitting a LS at A such as A ≤ Af. We suppose ¯ vb
m > ¯ vm
f
and Af < Ah, which is conﬁrmed in the end. In the following, we exclude LSs at A such
as Ah < A because no buyer submits a MB to such a high ask.
Let vs
h = πb(z+πb)(Ah−vL). A seller obtains at least vs
h to any book. This is because
if a seller t0 submits a LS at Ah, he cannot trade with tb because Af < Ah, and he may
not be able to trade with tsb because ts may undercut Ah, but he can trade with tnb and
tbb. That is, vs
h is the reservation utility for a seller.
Using vs
h, let Au be the ask satisfying vs
h = πb(1 + z)(Au − vL). A LS at Au yields
vs
h to a seller t0 by trading with tb and tnb. Similarly, let Al be the ask satisfying vs
h =
πb(1+z+πs)(Al −vL). A LS at Al yields vs
h to a seller t0 by trading with tb, tnb, and tsb.
In addition, let vs
f = πb(1 + z)(Af − vL) . vs
f is the expected utility for a seller facing an
empty book as we will show in the following. Figure 5 depicts the relation between these
asks and the expected utilities. As the ﬁgure shows, Al < Au < Af < Ah.
Now, we present the equilibrium strategies for a seller. If the book is empty, the
optimal ask for a seller is Af. If the book has a LS at A−1 submitted one period ago,
the optimal ask for a seller is Ah if A−1 ≤ Al, Al if Al < A−1 < Au + k, A−1 − k if
Au + k ≤ A−1 ≤ Af, and Af if Af < A−1. The optimal ask does not depend on the
ask of a LS submitted two periods ago because limit orders expire in two periods. Given
these strategies, a seller t0 can trade with tsb if he submits a LS at Al because such an
aggressive ask deters ts from further quote-cutting. If a seller submits a LS at A such
as A > Al, he can not trade with tsb. In what follows, we show these asks are indeed
optimal.
Suppose a seller t0 faces an empty book. If he submits a LS at A such as A ≤ Al, the
next seller ts submits a LS at Ah, t0 can trade with tsb, tnb, and tb, and his expected utility
is πb(1+z +πs)(A−vL). Among these asks, Al yields the maximum expected utility vs
h.
If t0 submits a LS at A such as Al < A ≤ Af, ts undercuts his ask, t0 can trade with tnb
and tb, and his expected utility is πb(1 + z)(A − vL). Among these asks, Af yields the
35maximum expected utility vs
f. If t0 submits a LS at A such as Af < A ≤ Ah, ts submits
a LS at Af, t0 can trade with tnb and tbb, and his expected utility is πb(z + πb)(A − vL).
Among these asks, Ah yields the maximum expected utility vs
h. In Figure 5, the solid
lines depict the expected utility for a seller facing an empty book with respect to the ask
at which he submits a LS. The ﬁgure shows that the optimal order is a LS at Af yielding
vs
f. The ﬁgure also suggests that a seller chooses an ask A ∈ {Al,Ah} ∪ [Au,Af] because
these asks yield the expected utility equal to or higher than the reservation utility vs
h.
Suppose a seller t0 faces the book with a LS at A−1 such as A−1 ≤ Al submitted
in the previous period. We will show that the optimal ask is Ah because the other asks
yield the expected utility less than the reservation utility. If he undercuts A−1, the next
seller ts submits a LS at Ah, t0 can trade with tsb, tnb, and tb, and his expected utility is
πb(1+z +πs)(A−vL). Among these asks, A−1 −k yields the maximum expected utility
πb(1 + z + πs)(A−1 − k − vL), which is smaller than vs
h. If he submits a LS at A such as
Al < A ≤ Ah, ts undercuts his ask, a MB from tb is matched with the existing LS, he can
trade with tnb and tbb, and his expected utility is πb(z + πb)(A − vL). Among these asks,
Ah yields the maximum expected utility vs
h. Thus, the optimal ask for t0 is Ah, and he
obtains the reservation utility vs
h. If the book has the very aggressive LS, the next seller
had better to submit a LS behind the market because undercutting the best ask further
incurs the cost in price without a suﬃcient gain in execution probability.
Suppose a seller t0 faces the book with a LS at A−1 such as Al < A−1 < Au + k
submitted in the previous period. If t0 submits a LS at A such as A ≤ Al, the next
seller ts submits a LS at Ah, he can trade with tsb, tnb, and tb, and his expected utility is
πb(1+z +πs)(A−vL). Among these asks, Al yields the maximum expected utility vs
h. If
t0 submits a LS at A such as Al < A < A−1, ts undercuts his ask, t0 can trade with tnb
and tb, and his expected utility is πb(1 + z)(A − vL). Among these asks, A−1 − k yields
the maximum expected utility πb(1 + z)(A−1 − k − vL) which is smaller than vs
h because
πb(1 + z)(A−1 − k − vL) < πb(1 + z)(Au − vL) = vs
h. If t0 submits a LS at A such as
A−1 ≤ A ≤ Ah, ts undercuts his ask, a MB from tb is matched with the existing LS, t0
can trade with tnb and tbb, and his expected utility is πb(z + πb)(A − vL). Among these
asks, Ah yields the maximum expected utility vs
h. Thus, the optimal ask for t0 is Al and
Ah both of which yield the reservation utility vs
h. A quote-cutting equilibrium designates
not Ah but Al.
Suppose a seller t0 faces the book with a LS at A−1 such as Au + k ≤ A−1 ≤ Af
submitted in the previous period. In this case, one-tick quote-cutting is optimal for the
following reason. Among asks A such as A ≤ Al, Al yields the maximum expected utility
vs
h because Al is the highest ask deterring further quote-cutting. If t0 submits a LS at
A−1 − k, ts undercuts his ask, t0 can trade with tnb and tb, and his expected utility is
πb(1 + z)(A − vL). Among these asks, A−1 − k yields the maximum expected utility
πb(1 + z)(A−1 − k − vL) which is equal to or greater than vs
h because A−1 ≥ Au + k.
Among asks A such as A−1 ≤ A ≤ Ah, Ah yields the maximum expected utility vs
h
36because the ask is undercut by ts. Thus, the optimal ask for t0 is A−1 − k yielding
πb(1 + z)(A−1 − k − vL) > vs
h.
Suppose a seller t0 faces the book with a LS at A−1 such as Af < A−1 submitted
in the previous period. The optimal ask for t0 is Af by the similar reason for Af to be
optimal to an empty book.
As a whole, the equilibrium strategies described above are indeed an equilibrium. For
the ﬁnal step, we endogenize ¯ vb
f and ¯ vb
m. Let Bf be the symmetric quote to Af. That
is, Bf is the optimal bid to an empty book. ¯ vb
m is the expected utility for a buyer t0 by
submitting a LS at Bf to the book with a LS at Af submitted in the previous period. By
a LB at Bf, t0 can trade with tbs because tb submits a MB to trade with the existing LS
at Af. t0 can also trade with ts and tns. Thus, ¯ vb
m = πs(1 + z + πb)(vH − Bf). Because
we have deﬁned Af = vH − ¯ vb
m,
vH − Af = πs(1 + z + πb)(vH − Bf). (16)
The symmetric argument leads to
Bf − vL = πb(1 + z + πs)(Af − vL). (17)
We obtain Af and Bf by solving Equations (16) and (17). On the whole, Af and Bf are
constructed for a buyer to submit a MB to a LS at Af as long as a seller submits a MS
to a LB at Bf, and vice versa. Because of symmetry, vs
f = πb(1 + z)(Af − vL) implies
¯ vb
f = πs(1+z)(vH −Bf). Then, Bf determines ¯ vb
f, which determines Ah, vs
h, Au, and Al.
Finally, ¯ vb
m > ¯ vb
f because ¯ vb
m = πs(1 + z + πb)(vH − Bf) > πs(1 + z)(vH − Bf) = ¯ vb
f. Up
to this point, we have explained the optimal order submission strategies of sellers.
A hole at the most aggressive quote is created for the following reason. In equilibrium,
the execution probability of a LS at A is πb(1 + z + πs) if A ≤ Al, whereas it is equal to
or less than πb(1 + z) if A > Al. Quote-cutting creates a discontinuity in the execution
probability at Al. For a LS at an ask slightly above Al, the gain in price does not
compensate for the loss in execution probability because of a discontinuity of execution
probability in price. Au is the minimum price oﬀsetting the loss in execution probability
since it is deﬁned as the ask yielding the reservation utility under expectation of future
quote-cutting. Thus, a seller never submits a LS at A ∈ (Al,Au), creating a hole.
A.5 Deﬁnitions for Theorem 3
In this subsection, we deﬁne the variables for the quote-cutting equilibrium in Theorem
3. There are three cases of equilibria according to the trader arrival π ∈ Π. Let g1 =
(1 − πs)2 − πsπb(1 − πb) and g2 = (1 − πb)2 − πsπb(1 − πs). We deﬁne Π1 = {π : g1 ≥
0, g2 ≥ 0} ∩ Π, Π2 = {π : g1 < 0} ∩ Π, and Π3 = {π : g2 < 0} ∩ Π. The set {Π1,Π2,Π3}
is the partition of Π and is illustrated in Figure 6. The arrival rate of buyers πb for
π ∈ Π2 is relatively small, as is that of sellers πs for π ∈ Π3. These disproportions cause
37the diﬀerences in equilibrium among π ∈ Π1, Π2, and Π3 in critical price levels and in
strategies oﬀ the equilibrium path.
The ﬁrst ask Af and the ﬁrst bid Bf submitted to an empty book are deﬁned as
follows. For i ∈ {1,2,3}, let Afi and Bfi be
Af1 =
(1 − πs)2vH + πs(2 − πs)(1 − πb)2vL
1 − πsπb(2 − πs)(2 − πb)
,
Bf1 =
πb(1 − πs)2(2 − πb)vH + (1 − πb)2vL
1 − πsπb(2 − πs)(2 − πb)
,
Af2 =
((1 − πs)2 + πsπ2
b)vH + πs(2 − πs)(1 − πb)vL
1 − πsπb(2 − πs − πb)
,
Bf2 =
πb((1 − πs)2 + πsπb)vH + (1 − πb)vL
1 − πsπb(2 − πs − πb)
,
Af3 =
(1 − πs)vH + πs((1 − πb)2 + πsπb)vL
1 − πsπb(2 − πs − πb)
,
Bf3 =
πb(1 − πs)(2 − πb)vH + ((1 − πb)2 + π2
sπb)vL
1 − πsπb(2 − πs − πb)
.
Furthermore, let Af = Afi and Bf = Bfi if π ∈ Πi for i ∈ {1,2,3}. Af1 = Af2 and
Bf1 = Bf2 for π ∈ Π satisfying g1 = 0. Af1 = Af3 and Bf1 = Bf3 for π ∈ Π satisfying
g2 = 0. Thus, Af and Bf are continuous in π ∈ Π.
We obtain Af and Bf for π ∈ Π1 by solving Equations (16) and (17). For π ∈ Π2,
the deﬁnitions of Af and Bf are slightly diﬀerent from those for π ∈ Π1 because πb is
relatively small, and the execution probability of a LS is low. Suppose the book has a
LB at Bf submitted in τ = −1. At stage 2, a seller t0 in τ = 0 submits a LS at a higher
ask Ah instead of Af to compensate for the low execution probability due to such a small
πb. By the LS at Ah, the seller t0 can trade with tsb, tnb, and tbb because ts submits a
MS to the LB at Bf and tb submits a LB at Bf. That is, the seller t0 gets the expected
utility πb(Ah − vL) at stage 2. To attract a MS of t0, the buyer in τ = −1 submits a LB
at Bf = vL + πb(Ah − vL), leading to
Bf − vL = πb(∆ − πs(1 + z)(vH − Bf)). (18)
Solving Equations (16) and (18) yields Af and Bf for π ∈ Π2. The symmetric equation
to Equation (18) is
vH − Af = πs(∆ − πb(1 + z)(Af − vL)). (19)
For π ∈ Π3, we obtain Af and Bf by solving Equations (17) and (19).
Once Af and Bf are deﬁned, the other variables are deﬁned as follows. They will be
conﬁrmed in the proof of Theorem 3. vb
f = πs(1 + z)(vH − Bf) is the expected utility a
38buyer gets by submitting a LB at Bf to an empty book on the equilibrium path. vb
f is the
maximum payoﬀ for a buyer to submit a LB. So, a buyer would submit a MB to a LS at
or below Ah = vH −vb
f. By submitting a LS at Ah, a seller can get the reservation utility
vs
h = πb(z + πb)(Ah − vL) in any circumstance. Al = vL + vs
h/πb/(1 + z + πs) is the ask
for a seller to get the reservation utility with the highest possible execution probability
πb(1 + z + πs). Au = vL + vs
h/πb/(1 + z) is the ask for a seller to get the reservation
utility with the execution probability πb(1 + z). A seller gets the reservation utility by
submitting a MS to a LB at Be = vL + vs
h. Let Ad(B) be
Ad(B) = argmaxA ∈ Nk s.t. vL + (B − vL)/πb/(1 + z) + k ≥ A.
Given the bid at B in the book, Ad(B) is the maximum ask that induces the next seller
not to undercut Ad(B) by one tick but to submit a MS to a LB at B because
B − vL ≥ πb(1 + z)(Ad(B) − k − vL).
Let Bc = vL + vs
f(1 + z)/(1 + z + πs). As shown by vs
f = πb(1 + z + πs)(Ad(Bc) − vL)
under k = 0, Bc is the critical bid in the book that equates vs
f with the expected utility
from a LS at Ad(B) with the highest possible execution probability.
The other variables are deﬁned symmetrically. vs
f = πb(1+z)(Af −vL) is the expected
utility a seller gets by submitting a LS at Af to an empty book on the equilibrium path.
A seller would submit a MS to a LB at or above Bl = vL +vs
f, and the reservation utility
of a buyer is vb
l = πs(z+πs)(vH −Bl). Bh = vH −vb
l/πs/(1+z+πb) is the bid for a buyer
to get the reservation utility with the highest possible execution probability πs(1+z+πb).
Bu = vH − vb
l/πs/(1 + z) is the bid for a buyer to get the reservation utility with the
execution probability πs(1+z). A buyer gets the reservation utility by submitting a MB
to a LS at Ae = vH − vb
l. Bd(A) is deﬁned as
Bd(A) = argminB ∈ Nk s.t. vH − (vH − A)/πs/(1 + z) − k ≤ B.
We deﬁne Ac = vH−vb
f(1+z)/(1+z+πb), which satisﬁes vb
f = πs(1+z+πb)(vH−Bd(Ac))
under k = 0.
We indicate variables for π ∈ Πi by a subscript i ∈ {1,2,3}. For example, vb
f1 =
πs(1 + z)(vH − Bf1) and Ah1 = vH − vb
f1 denote the variables for π ∈ Π1. Let D1 =
1 − πsπb(2 − πs)(2 − πb) and D2 = D3 = 1 − πsπb(1 + z). By deﬁnition, D1 ∈ (0,1) and
D2 = D3 ∈ (0,1) for π ∈ Π.
A.6 Theorem 3
Theorem 3: Suppose that limit orders expire in two period after their submission, that
the discount factor of every trader is one, and that Aj,Bj ∈ Nk for j ∈ {l,f,h,c},
Au + k ≤ Af, and Bf ≤ Bu − k. The following proﬁle of strategies is a pure strategy
Markov perfect equilibrium for π ∈ Π.
(s1): For (n,n,n,n) or (n,n,A−2,n), not depending on A−2, a seller submits a LS at Af.
39(s2): For (B−2,n,n,n), a seller submits a LS at Af if B−2 < Bl and a MS if Bl ≤ B−2.
(s3): For (n,B−1,A−2,n) or (n,B−1,n,n), not depending on A−2, a seller submits a LS
at Af if B−1 < Bc, a LS at Ad(B−1) if Bc ≤ B−1 < Bl, a LS at Af (Ah) if Bl ≤ B−1 < Bf
and if π ∈ Π1 ∪ Π3 (π ∈ Π2), and a MS if Bf ≤ B−1.
(s4): For (B−2,B−1,n,n), a seller submits a LS at Af if B−1 < Bc and if B−2 < Bl, a
LS at Ad(B−1) if Bc ≤ B−1 < Bl and if B−2 < πb(2 − πb)(Ad(B−1) − vL) + vL, and a LS
at Af (Ah) if Bl ≤ B−1 < Bf, if B−2 < Bf, and if π ∈ Π1 ∪ Π3 (π ∈ Π2). In the other
cases, a seller submits a MS.
(s5): For (n,n,n,A−1) or (n,n,A−2,A−1), not depending on A−2, a seller submits a LS at
Ah if A−1 ≤ Al, a LS at Al if Al < A−1 < Au+k, a LS at A−1−k if Au+k ≤ A−1 ≤ Af,
and a LS at Af if Af < A−1.
(s6): For (B−2,n,n,A−1), a seller submits a LS at Ah if A−1 ≤ Al and if B−2 < Be, a LS
at Al if Al < A−1 < Au +k and if B−2 < Be, a LS at A−1 −k if Au +k ≤ A−1 ≤ Af and
if B−2 < vL + πb(1 + z)(A−1 − k − vL), and a LS at Af if Af < A−1 and if B−2 < Bl. In
the other cases, a seller submits a MS.
(b1): For (n,n,n,n) or (B−2,n,n,n), not depending on B−2, a buyer submits a LB at
Bf.
(b2): For (n,n,A−2,n), a buyer submits a MB if A−2 ≤ Ah and a LB at Bf if Ah < A−2.
(b3): For (B−2,n,n,A−1) or (n,n,n,A−1), not depending on B−2, a buyer submits a MB
if A−1 ≤ Af, a LB at Bf (Bl) if Af < A−1 ≤ Ah and if π ∈ Π1 ∪ Π2 (π ∈ Π3), a LB at
Bd(A−1) if Ah < A−1 ≤ Ac, and a LB at Bf if Ac < A−1.
(b4): For (n,n,A−2,A−1), a buyer submits a LB at Bf (Bl) if Af < A−1 ≤ Ah, if Af <
A−2, and if π ∈ Π1 ∪ Π2 (π ∈ Π3). A buyer submits a LB at Bd(A−1) if Ah < A−1 ≤ Ac
and if vH−πs(2−πs)(vH−Bd(A−1)) < A−2, and a LB at Bf if Ac < A−1 and if Ah < A−2.
In the other cases, a buyer submits a MB.
(b5): For (n,B−1,n,n) or (B−2,B−1,n,n), not depending on B−2, a buyer submits a
LB at Bf if B−1 < Bf, a LB at B−1 + k if Bf ≤ B−1 ≤ Bu − k, a LB at Bh if
Bu − k < B−1 < Bh, and a LB at Bl if Bh ≤ B−1.
(b6): For (n,B−1,A−2,n), a buyer submits a LB at Bf if B−1 < Bf and if Ah < A−2,
a LB at B−1 + k if Bf ≤ B−1 ≤ Bu − k and if vH − πs(1 + z)(vH − B−1 − k) < A−2, a
LB at Bh if Bu − k < B−1 < Bh and if Ae < A−2, and a LB at Bl if Bh ≤ B−1 and if
Ae < A−2. In the other cases, a buyer submits a MB.
Remark 1: The conditions Aj, Bj ∈ Nk for j ∈ {l,f,h,c} are required to avoid the
complexity from discreteness in price as discussed in Section 3.
Remark 2: The condition Au + k ≤ Af is required for A−1 ∈ [Au + k,Af] to exist
for strategies in (s5) and (s6). Then, there is at least one one-tick quote-cutting. The
condition Bf ≤ Bu − k is required for the reasons of symmetry.
Remark 3: The conditions in Theorem 3 mentioned in Remarks 1 and 2 are satisﬁed if
40the diﬀerence in the valuation ∆ = vH −vL is large enough relative to the tick size k. For
example, 21 is the minimum integer for vH to meet the conditions under the parameter
values vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2. We use these parameter values for a numerical
example in Section 5.2.
Remark 4: The diﬀerence in strategies between π ∈ Π1 and π ∈ Π2 is the limit price when
B−1 ∈ [Bl,Bf) in (s3) and (s4). The diﬀerence in strategies between π ∈ Π1 and π ∈ Π3
is the limit price when A−1 ∈ (Af,Ah] in (b3) and (b4).
Remark 5: Strategies in (s1) and (s5) relate to the quote dynamics in Corollary 1.
Remark 6: Equilibrium is not necessarily unique. One source of multiplicity is the non-
uniqueness of optimal strategies, as the following example shows. Consider the parameter
values vH = 21, vL = 0, k = 1, and πs = πb = 1/2. In this case, Bl = 6, and (s6) in
Theorem 3 designates a seller to submit a MS to (6,n,n,13). On the other hand, there is
an equilibrium where strategies are the same as those in Theorem 3, but a seller submits
not a MS but a LS at Af = 12 to (6,n,n,13). Because the execution probability of a LS
at Af to (6,n,n,13) is 1/2, a MS and a LS at Af yield the same expected utility of 6,
which causes multiple equilibria.
Remark 7: The monotonicity of execution probability in quote of a limit order is a
favorable feature in comparative statics of limit order markets. For example, Goettler et
al. (2005) assume it in their Proposition 1. However, the latter equilibrium in Remark 6
is an example of equilibrium where the execution probability is not monotonic in quote.
If a seller t0 submits a LS at 13 to (n,6,n,n), the book changes to (6,n,n,13), and ts
submits a LS at 12. If a seller t0 submits a LS at 14 to (n,6,n,n), the book changes to
(6,n,n,14), and ts submits a MS. This diﬀerence in the order of ts makes the execution
probability of a LS at 14, 1/2, greater than that of a LS at 13, 1/4. Although, it is not
clear whether this example is signiﬁcant or not because this non-monotonicity occurs oﬀ
the equilibrium path.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 is proved simply by checking the optimality of a strategy for each type of
trader and for every state of the book. The proof is constructed in Steps 1 and 2. In Step
1, we show that for π ∈ Π1, optimal strategies for a seller t0 are strategies from (s1) to
(s6) in Theorem 3 if sellers and buyers arriving after t0 follow strategies in Theorem 3. A
symmetric argument is applied to strategies from (b1) to (b6). In Step 2, we prove the
case for π ∈ Π2 ∪ Π3.
Before Step 1, we present Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 to prove the theorem. The proofs of
lemmas are straightforward.
41Lemma 1: (1) For π ∈ Π, 0 < vs
h < vs
f < ∆ and 0 < vb
l < vb
f < ∆. (2) For π ∈ Π, vL <
Al < Au < Af < Ah < Ac ≤ Ae < vH and vL < Be ≤ Bc < Bl < Bf < Bu < Bh < vH.
(3) For π ∈ Π, Bf < Af, Be < Al, Bh < Ae, and Au < Buɽ
Lemma 2: For π ∈ Π, π2
b(Ac − vL) < vs
f and π2
s(vH − Bc) < vb
f.
Lemma 3: (1) For π ∈ Π1, πb(2 − πb)(Af1 − vL) ≥ πb(Ah1 − vL) and πs(2 − πs)(vH −
Bf1) ≥ πs(vH − Bl1). (2) For π ∈ Π2, πb(2 − πb)(Af2 − vL) < πb(Ah2 − vL) and πs(2 −
πs)(vH − Bf2) > πs(vH − Bl2). (3) For π ∈ Π3, πb(2 − πb)(Af3 − vL) > πb(Ah3 − vL) and
πs(2 − πs)(vH − Bf3) < πs(vH − Bl3).
Step 1: the case for π ∈ Π1.
(s1) Under the book (n,n,n,n) or (n,n,A−2,n), if t0 submits a LS at A0 at stage 2,
the book becomes (n,n,n,A0). If A0 ≤ Af1, tb submits a MB according to (b3). The
possibility for tbb to submit a MB is as follows: If Af1 < A0 ≤ Ah1, tb submits a LB at
Bf1 according to (b3). In this case, tbb faces (n,Bf1,A0,n) and submits a MB according
to (b6). If Ah1 < A0 ≤ Ac1, tb submits a LB at Bd(A0), and tbb faces (n,Bd(A0),A0,n).
For A0 ∈ (Ah1,Ac1], because Ac1 ≤ Ae1 and because Bd(A) is non-decreasing in A,
Bf − k = vH −
vH − Ah1
πs(1 + z)
− k < vH −
vH − A0
πs(1 + z)




which implies that A0 ≤ vH − πs(1 + z)(vH − Bd(A0) − k) and Bf1 ≤ Bd(A0) ≤ Bu1 − k.
Thus, tbb submits a MB if Ah1 < A0 ≤ Ac1 according to (b6). If Ac1 < A0, tb submits a
LB at Bf1 and tbb faces (n,Bf1,A0,n). In that case,
vH − πs(1 + z)(vH − Bf1 − k) = Ah1 + πs(1 + z)k ≤ Ah1 + k ≤ Ac1 < A0
because Ah1,Ac1 ∈ Nk and because Ah1 < Ac1 implies Ah1 + k ≤ Ac1. Thus, tbb submits
a LB at Bf1 + k according to (b6). On the whole, tbb submits a MB if Af1 < A0 ≤ Ac1.
tnb faces (n,n,A0,n) and submits a MB if A0 ≤ Ah1 according to (b2). t0’s LS at A0 is
matched with tsb’s MB if A0 ≤ Al1. The reason is as follows: if Al1 < A0, ts submits a
LS strictly lower than min[A0,Af1 + k] according to (s5). Then, tsb faces (n,n,A0,A1)
with A1 ≤ Af1 and submits a MB according to (b4). tsb’s MB is matched with ts’s LS
because of price precedence. If A0 ≤ Al1, ts submits a LS at Ah1 according to (s5). Then,
tsb faces (n,n,A0,Ah1) and submits a MB, which is matched with t0’s LS.
In brief, if an ask A0 at which t0 submits a LS is A0 ≤ Al1, its execution probability is
πb(1+z +πs) because he can trade with tb, tnb, and tsb. If Al1 < A0 ≤ Af1, its execution
probability is πb(1 + z) because he can trade with tb and tnb. If Af1 < A0 ≤ Ah1,
its execution probability is πb(z + πb) because he can trade with tbb and tnb. If Ah1 <
A0 ≤ Ac1, its execution probability is π2
b because he can trade with tbb. If Ac1 < A0, its
execution probability is zero.
The optimal asks among those with the same execution probability are Al1, Af1, Ah1,




b(Ac1 − vL), respectively.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it is optimal for t0 to get vs
f1 by submitting a LS at Af1.
42(s2) Under the book (B−2,n,n,n) the decision at stage 2 is the same as that in (s1).
At stage 1, if Bl1 ≤ B−2, vs
f1 ≤ B−2 − vL and t0 submits a MS. In the other cases, he
submits a LS at Af1.
(s3) Under the book (n,B−1,A−2,n) or (n,B−1,n,n), if t0 submits a LS at A0 > B−1,
the book becomes (B−1,n,n,A0). For the same reason in (s1), it can be matched with
tb’s MB if A0 ≤ Af1 and with tbb’s MB if Af1 < A0 ≤ Ac1. tnb submits a MB if A0 ≤ Ah1
according to (b2). When the book is (B−1,n,n,A0), ts follows (s6). In the case where
ts submits a MS, tsb faces (n,n,A0,n) and submits a MB if A0 ≤ Ah1 according to (b2).
In the case where ts does not submit a MS, if A0 ≤ Al1, ts submits a LS at Ah1 and
tsb submits a MB, which is matched with t0’s LS. In the other cases, t0’s LS will not be
executed.
When B−1 < Be1, because of Be1 < Al1 from Lemma 1(3) and for the same reason as
in (s1), it is optimal for t0 to get vs
f1 by submitting a LS at Af1. He does not submit a
MS because Be1 − vL < vs
f1.
When Be1 ≤ B−1 < Bl1, the optimal asks among those with the same execution




b(Ac1 −vL), respectively. Because of Lemmas 1 and 2,
the optimal asks are either Af1 or Ad(B−1). From the deﬁnition of Ad(B), we have
vL + (Bc1 − vL)/πb/(1 + z) < Ad(Bc1), Ad(Bc1 − k) ≤ vL + (Bc1 − k − vL)/πb/(1 + z) + k,
which imply vs
f1 < πb(1 + z + πs)(Ad(Bc1) − vL) and
πb(1 + z + πs)(Ad(Bc1 − k) − vL) ≤ vs
f1 + πb(1 + z + πs)(1 − 1/(πb(1 + z)))k < vs
f1.
Since Ad(B) is non-decreasing in B, it is optimal for t0 to submit a LS at Af1 if Be1 ≤
B−1 < Bc1 (if Be = Bc there is no B−1 satisfying this condition) and to submit a LS at
Ad(B−1) if Bc1 ≤ B−1 < Bl1. He does not submit a MS because Bc1 − vL < vs
f1 and
Bl1 − vL = vs
f1 < πb(1 + z + πs)(Ad(B−1) − vL) for Bc1 ≤ B−1 < Bl1.
When Bl1 ≤ B−1 < Af1, the optimal asks among those with the same execution
probability are Af1, Ah1, and Ac1, which yield the expected utilities πb(1+z +πs)(Af1 −
vL), πb(Ah1 − vL), and π2
b(Ac1 − vL), respectively. Because of Lemmas 2 and 3, it is
optimal for t0 to get πb(1 + z + πs)(Af1 − vL) by submitting a LS at Af1. However, if
Bf1 ≤ B−1 < Af1, πb(1 + z + πs)(Af1 − vL) ≤ B−1 − vL and t0 submits a MS. In short,
t0 submits a LS at Af1 if Bl1 ≤ B−1 < Bf1, and a MS if Bf1 ≤ B−1 < Af1.
When Af1 ≤ B−1, t0 submits a MS because it yields a higher expected utility than a
LS at Ah1 or Ac1.
(s4) Under the book (B−2,B−1,n,n), the decision at stage 2 is the same as that in (s3).
At stage 1, t0 submits a MS in the following cases. When B−1 < Bc1, because he gets vs
f1
at stage 2, he submits a MS if B−2 ≥ vL + vs
f1 = Bl1. When Bc1 ≤ B−1 < Bl1, because
he gets πb(1 + z + πs)(Ad(B−1) − vL) at stage 2, he submits a MS if B−2 ≥ vL + πb(1 +
z+πs)(Ad(B−1)−vL). When Bl1 ≤ B−1 < Bf1, because he gets πb(1+z+πs)(Af1−vL)
43at stage 2, he submits a MS if B−2 ≥ Bf1. When Bf1 ≤ B−1, he submits a MS for the
same reason as in (s3).
(s5) Under the book (n,n,n,A−1) or (n,n,A−2,A−1), if t0 submits a LS at A0, the
book becomes (n,n,A−1,A0). When Ah1 < A−1, it is optimal for t0 to get vs
f1 by
submitting a LS at Af1 because the LS at Af1 is optimal under the book (n,n,n,n) from
(s1), and because a higher price priority is assigned to t0’s LS than to the LS at A−1.
When Af1 < A−1 ≤ Ah1, to get the execution probability π2
b, t0 has to submit a LS at
an ask lower than Ac1 because of strategies in (b4). The execution probabilities for other
asks are the same as those for (s1). Since the optimal ask is not Ac1 but Af1 in (s1), it
is optimal for t0 to submit a LS at Af1.
Next consider the case where A−1 ≤ Af1. tb submits a MB according to (b4). If
A0 < A−1, t0’s LS can be matched with tb’s MB. If A−1 ≤ A0, a LS at A−1 is matched
with tb’s MB. Then, tbb faces the book (n,n,A0,n) and submits a MB if A0 ≤ Ah1
according to (b2). tnb submits a MB if A0 ≤ Ah1 according to (b2). ts follows (s5). To
get a higher price priority over ts’s LS, t0 must submit a LS such as A0 ≤ Al1. In this
case, tsb submits a MB according to (b4), which is matched with t0’s LS.
When A−1 ≤ Al1, the optimal asks among those with the same execution probability
are A−1−k, Al1, and Ah1, which yield the expected utilities πb(2−πb)(A−1−k−vL) < vs
h1,
πb(Al1 − vL) < vs
h1, and vs
h1, respectively. Thus, t0 submits a LS at Ah1 to get vs
h1.
When Al1 < A−1 < Au1 + k, the optimal asks among those with the same execution
probability are Al1, A−1 −k if A−1 −k > Al1, and Ah1, which yield the expected utilities
vs
h1, πb(1+z)(A−1 −k −vL) < πb(1+ z)(Au1 −vL) = vs
h1, and vs
h1, respectively. He then
submits a LS at Al1 to get vs
h1.
When Au1 + k ≤ A−1 ≤ Af1, the optimal asks among those with the same execution
probability are Al1, A−1 − k, and Ah1, which yield the expected utilities vs
h1, πb(1 +
z)(A−1 − k − vL) ≥ πb(1 + z)(Au1 − vL) = vs
h1, and vs
h1, respectively. Then, he submits a
LS at A−1 − k to get πb(1 + z)(A−1 − k − vL).
To summarize, t0 submits a LS at Ah1 to get vs
h1 if A−1 ≤ Al1, a LS at Al1 to get vs
h1 if
Al1 < A−1 < Au1+k, a LS at A−1−k to get πb(1+z)(A−1−k−vL) if Au1+k ≤ A−1 ≤ Af1,
and a LS at Af1 to get vs
f1 if Af1 < A−1.
(s6) Under the book (B−2,n,n,A−1), the optimal LS and its expected utility at stage
2 are just the same as those in (s5). At stage 1, when A−1 < Au1 + k, t0 submits a MS
if vs
h1 ≤ B−2 − vL, that is, Be1 ≤ B−2. When Au1 + k ≤ A−1 ≤ Af1, he submits a MS if
πb(1+z)(A−1−k−vL) ≤ B−2−vL. When Af1 < A−1, he submits a MS if vs
f1 ≤ B−2−vL,
i.e., Bl1 ≤ B−2.
The above argument proves that the strategies of sellers in the theorem are optimal
for π ∈ Π1. We can use a symmetric argument for the strategies of buyers. We have thus
proved the theorem for π ∈ Π1.
Step 2: the case for π ∈ Π2 ∪ Π3.
44Consider the case π ∈ Π2. Between π ∈ Π1 and π ∈ Π2, strategies diﬀer in (s3) and
(s4) due to Lemma 3. First, we will check the optimality of (s3) for π ∈ Π2. Under the
book (n,B−1,A−2,n) or (n,B−1,n,n), the execution probabilities and optimal strategies
for B−1 < Bl2 are just the same as those for π ∈ Π1. When Bl2 ≤ B−1, the optimal asks
among those with the same execution probability are Af2, Ah2, and Ac2, which yield the
expected utilities πb(1+z+πs)(Af2−vL), πb(Ah2−vL), and π2
b(Ac2−vL), respectively. It
is optimal for t0 to get πb(Ah2−vL) by submitting a LS at Ah2 if Bl2 ≤ B−1 < Bf2 because
of Lemmas 2 and 3(2). He submits a MS if Bf2 ≤ B−2 because πb(Ah2 −vL) = Bf2 −vL.
Thus, strategies in (s3) are optimal for π ∈ Π2. The optimality of (s4) for π ∈ Π2 is
similar.
Diﬀerences in the strategies of sellers in (s3) and (s4) do not aﬀect sellers’ other
strategies since the expected utilities of sellers are aﬀected by other sellers only through
strategies in (s5) and (s6). In addition, it does not aﬀect the optimal strategies of buyers,
either. To verify this, consider the symmetric case π ∈ Π3. Strategies in (b3) and (b4) for
π ∈ Π3 are diﬀerent from those for π ∈ Π1. These diﬀerences do not aﬀect the strategies
of sellers for the following reason. In proving the case π ∈ Π1, strategies in (b3) and
(b4) are explicitly used to conﬁrm the optimality of strategies in (s1). Concerning (s1),
when t0 submits a LS at A0 such as Af3 < A0 ≤ Ah3, tb submits a LB not at Bf3 but
at Bl3 according to (b3) when π ∈ Π3. Then, tbb faces (n,Bl3,A0,n) and submits a MB
according to (b6). This does not change t0’s expected utility. Similarly, for the other states
of the book, the diﬀerences of strategies in (b3) and (b4) between π ∈ Π1 and π ∈ Π3
do not aﬀect the expected utilities of sellers. By symmetric argument, the diﬀerences of
strategies in (s3) and (s4) between π ∈ Π1 and π ∈ Π2 do not aﬀect the optimal strategies
of buyers. We have thus proved the theorem for the case π ∈ Π2, thereby completing the
proof of Theorem 3 since the case for π ∈ Π3 is symmetric. Q.E.D.
A.8 Theorem 4
Theorem 4: Let ˆ α = 2γ/(1−γ)/(δp−δi), wp = α∆/(2+αδp), and wi = α(1−γ)∆/(2+
α(1 − γ)δi). By wp and wi, let Ap = vH − δpwp, Bp = vL + δpwp, Ai = vH − δiwi, and
Bi = vL+δiwi. Under Assumption 1, there are the following three types of Markov perfect
equilibria depending on the parameter values. If α < ˆ α, a Markov perfect equilibrium is
Type 1 and unique. If ˆ α < 1 and α > ˆ α, a Markov perfect equilibrium is Type 2 and
unique. If α = ˆ α ≤ 1, there are multiple Markov perfect equilibria described in Type 3.
Type 1: A patient seller submits a MS if the book has a LB at B ≥ Bp, and submits
a LS at Ap otherwise. An impatient seller submits a MS if the book has a LB at B ≥
vL +δiwp, and submits a LS at Ap otherwise. A patient buyer submits a MB if the book
has a LS at A ≤ Ap, and submits a LB at Bp otherwise. An impatient buyer submits a
MB if the book has a LS at A ≤ vH − δiwp, and submits a LB at Bp otherwise.
Type 2: A patient seller submits a MS if the book has a LB at B ≥ vL + δpwi, and
submits a LS at Ai otherwise. An impatient seller submits a MS if the book has a LB at
45B ≥ Bi, and submits a LS at Ai otherwise. A patient buyer submits a MB if the book has
a LS at A ≤ vH − δpwi, and submits a LB at Bi otherwise. An impatient buyer submits
a MB if the book has a LS at A ≤ Ai, and submits a LB at Bi otherwise.
Type 3: Let σps, σis, σpb, and σib be some numbers in [0,1]. A patient seller submits
a MS if the book has a LB at B ≥ Bp. Otherwise, he submits a LS at Ap with probability
σps and submits a LS at Ai with probability 1−σps. An impatient seller submits a MS if
the book has a LB at B ≥ Bi. Otherwise, he submits a LS at Ap with probability σis and
submits a LS at Ai with probability 1 − σis. A patient buyer submits a MB if the book
has a LS at A ≤ Ap. Otherwise, he submits a LB at Bp with probability σpb and submits
a LB at Bi with probability 1−σpb. An impatient buyer submits a MB if the book has a
LS at A ≤ Ai. Otherwise, he submits a LB at Bp with probability σib and submits a LB
at Bi with probability 1 − σib.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 4
To prove the optimality of strategies is straightforward since the quotes in the theorem
are the solutions of the following simultaneous equations
Bp − vL = δpπb(Ap − vL), vH − Ap = δpπs(vH − Bp),
Bi − vL = δiπb(1 − γ)(Ai − vL), vH − Ai = δiπs(1 − γ)(vH − Bi).
wp and wi are deﬁned as wp = πb(Ap − vL) and wi = πb(1 − γ)(Ai − vL). If α = ˆ α,
wp = wi. Thus, if α = ˆ α, a seller is indiﬀerent between Ap and Ai in submitting a LS and
a buyer is indiﬀerent between Bp and Bi in submitting a LB. For α = ˆ α ≤ 1, Ap > Bp
because Ap − Bp = (2/ˆ α − δp)wp > 0.
To prove the uniqueness of an equilibrium under α ̸= ˆ α, we ﬁrst establish Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 1, the expected utility obtained by submitting a limit order
to an empty book divided by the discount factor is uniquely determined for any trader as
wp if α < ˆ α, wp = wi if α = ˆ α, and wi if α > ˆ α.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let ws(A,x) = Φ(s,A,ω0,π,x)(A−vL) and wb(B,x) = Φ(b,B,ω0,π,x)(vH−
B) where ω0 represents an empty book. The expected utility by submitting a LS at A
to an empty book under a proﬁle of strategies x is δpws(A,x) for a patient seller and
δiws(A,x) for an impatient seller, respectively. The expected utility by submitting a LB
at B to an empty book under a proﬁle of strategies x is δpwb(B,x) for a patient buyer and
δiwb(B,x) for an impatient buyer, respectively. Let Ms and ms be the supremum and
the inﬁmum of ws(A,x) for any Markov perfect equilibrium, respectively. Symmetrically,
let Mb and mb be the supremum and the inﬁmum of wb(B,x) for any Markov perfect
equilibrium, respectively. We shall show that ms = Ms = mb = Mb.
46A patient buyer always submits a MB to the book with a LS at A if vH −A > δpMb,
and an impatient buyer always submits a MB to the book with a LS at A if vH−A > δiMb.
Thus, the inﬁmum of the expected utility of a seller satisﬁes
ms ≥ (α/2)(∆ − δpMb), (20)
and
ms ≥ (α/2)(1 − γ)(∆ − δiMb). (21)
A patient buyer never submits a MB to the book with a LS at A if vH − A < δpmb, and
an impatient buyer never submits a MB to the book with a LS at A if vH − A < δimb.
Thus, the supremum of the expected utility of a seller satisﬁes
Ms ≤ (α/2)max[y1,y2] (22)
where y1 = ∆ − δpmb and y2 = (1 − γ)(∆ − δimb). Symmetrically, we have
mb ≥ (α/2)(∆ − δpMs), (23)
mb ≥ (α/2)(1 − γ)(∆ − δiMs), (24)
Mb ≤ (α/2)max[y3,y4], (25)
where y3 = ∆ − δpms and y4 = (1 − γ)(∆ − δims).
Inequalities (20) through (25) must be satisﬁed for any Markov perfect equilibrium.
We distinguish the following ﬁve cases to specify Ms, ms, Mb, and mb; Case 1: y1 > y2
and y3 > y4; Case 2: y1 < y2 and y3 < y4; Case 3: y1 = y2 and y3 = y4; Case 4: y1 > y2
and y3 < y4; Case 5: y1 < y2 and y3 > y4.
Case 1: Inequalities (20) and (25) together imply
ms ≥ (α/2)(∆ − δpMb) ≥ (α/2)(∆ − δp(α/2)(∆ − δpms)). (26)
This can be arranged to give ms ≥ wp. Similarly, Inequalities (22) and (23) give Ms ≤ wp.
Thus, we have ms = Ms = wp. Symmetrically, we have mb = Mb = wp from Inequalities
(20), (22), (23), and (25). In addition, ms, Ms, mb, and Mb must satisfy Inequalities
(21), (24), y1 > y2, and y3 > y4, which are satisﬁed if α < ˆ α. As a whole, if α < ˆ α, then
ws(A,x) and wb(B,x) are uniquely determined as wp for any Markov perfect equilibrium.
Case 2: Inequalities (21), (22), (24), and (25) give ms = Ms = mb = Mb = wi.
Inequalities (20), (23), y1 < y2, and y3 < y4 are satisﬁed if α > ˆ α. As a whole, if
α > ˆ α, then ws(A,x) and wb(B,x) are uniquely determined as wi for any Markov perfect
equilibrium.
Case 3: Inequalities (20) through (25) give ms = Ms = mb = Mb = wp = wi. These
equations along with y1 = y2 and y3 = y4 are satisﬁed if α = ˆ α. Thus, for any Markov
perfect equilibrium, if α = ˆ α, then ws(A,x) and wb(B,x) are uniquely determined as wp,
and wp = wi.
47Case 4: Inequalities (20), (22), (24), and (25) give ms = Ms = α(2−α(1−γ)δp)∆/(4−
α2(1−γ)δpδi) and mb = Mb = α(1−γ)(2−αδi)∆/(4−α2(1−γ)δpδi). y1 > y2 is satisﬁed
under α < ˆ α and y3 < y4 is satisﬁed under α > ˆ α. Thus, there is no equilibrium under
Case 4.
Case 5: By reason of the symmetry with Case 4, there is no equilibrium under Case
5. Q.E.D.
Now, we prove the uniqueness of a Markov perfect equilibrium under α < ˆ α. Lemma
4 shows that, if α < ˆ α, a patient seller and a patient buyer obtain the expected utility
δpwp by submitting a limit order, and an impatient seller and an impatient buyer obtain
the expected utility δiwp by submitting a limit order. First, we specify the execution
probability, φ, of a LS given the expected utility of buyers. Next, we search for the ask,
A′, which is consistent with the expected utility of a seller and the execution probability
φ, that is, wp = φ(A′ − vL).
The execution probability of a LS is as follows. Because a patient buyer obtains δpwp
by submitting a LB, he does not submit a MB to the book with a LS at A such as
A > vH − δpwp = Ap, and submits a MB to the book with a LS at A such as A < Ap.
He would submit a MB with some probability σ ∈ [0,1] to the book with a LS at Ap. An
impatient buyer obtains δiwp by submitting a LB, and he submits a MB in the similar
way to a patient buyer. Thus, the execution probability of a LS at A is (1) α/2 if A < Ap,
(2) α(1 − γ + γσ)/2 if A = Ap, where σ ∈ [0,1], (3) α(1 − γ)/2 if Ap < A < vH − δiwp,
(4) α(1 − γ)σ/2 if A = vH − δiwp, where σ ∈ [0,1], and (5) 0 if A > vH − δiwp.
The ask A′ which satisﬁes wp = φ(A′ − vL) is as follows. (1) If A′ < Ap, wp =
α(A′ − vL)/2. This equation leads to A′ = Ap, which does not satisfy A′ < Ap. Thus,
there is no A′ under A′ < Ap. (2) If A′ = Ap, wp = α(1 − γ + γσ)(A′ − vL)/2, and
σ = 1 satisﬁes this equation. Thus, submitting a LS at Ap of a seller and submitting
a MB to the book with a LS at Ap of a patient buyer and of an impatient buyer are
consistent with Lemma 4. An equilibrium of Type 1 designates these strategies. (3)
If Ap < A′ < vH − δiwp, wp = α(1 − γ)(A′ − vL)/2, and A′ = vL + 2wp/α/(1 − γ).
A′ > vH − δiwp because A′ − (vH − δiwp) = (ˆ α − α)(δp − δi)wp/α > 0. Thus, there is no
A′ under Ap < A′ < vH − δiwp. (4) If A′ = vH − δiwp, wp = α(1 − γ)σ(A′ − vL)/2. This
equation yields 1 = σ(1 − γ(1 − α/ˆ α)). Because α < ˆ α, σ > 1, which is not consistent
with σ ∈ [0,1]. Thus, there is no A′ under A′ = vH − δiwp. (5) If A′ > vH − δiwp, the
execution probability is zero, which is not consistent with wp > 0. Thus, there is no A′
under A′ > vH −δiwp. As a whole, under α < ˆ α, strategies of sellers in Type 1 are unique
strategies which are consistent with Lemma 4.
Symmetrically, under α < ˆ α, strategies of buyers in Type 1 are unique strategies which
are consistent with Lemma 4. Thus, an equilibrium of Type 1 is a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium under α < ˆ α. The similar argument proves that an equilibrium of Type 2
constitutes a unique Markov perfect equilibrium under α > ˆ α. Q.E.D.
48A.10 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: Straightforward. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: (1) The direct calculation shows ∂Ar/∂πs < 0. The bid side is
symmetric.
(2) The direct calculation shows ∂Ar/∂πb > 0. The bid side is symmetric.
(3) ∂Ar/∂α = ψ1(α,β)β∆/(1 − α2(1 − β)β)2, where ψ1(α,β) = −1 + 2α(1 − β) −
α2β(1−β). Thus, ∂Ar/∂α < 0 if ψ1(α,β) < 0. Since ψ1(α,β) increases in α, ψ1(α,β) < 0





∂Ar/∂α < 0 for β > (3 −
√
5)/2. The bid side is symmetric.
(4) The set of the states of the book on the equilibrium path is {empty, a book
with a LS at Ar, a book with a LB at Br}. Because the stationary distribution is
((1 − πs)(1 − πb)/(1 − πsπb),πs(1 − πb)/(1 − πsπb),πb(1 − πs)/(1 − πsπb)), the expected
spread sr is
sr =
(1 − πs)(1 − πb)(1 + πs + πb − πsπb)





1 − β(1 − β)(4 − (2 − α)(1 − αβ)(1 − α(1 − β)))
(1 − α2β(1 − β))3 < 0
because β(1 − β) ≤ 1/4 and (2 − α)(1 − αβ)(1 − α(1 − β)) < 2.
(5) The direct calculation shows that ∂Ar/∂β < 0. The bid side is symmetric. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Straightforward. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: If α = 1, z = 0 and there is no queuing equilibrium under Cases
2, 3, and 4 in the proof of Theorem 2. Thus, the queuing equilibrium satisﬁes Conditions
(8) and (9), leading to the inequality in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: (1) Af − Bf > 0 from Lemma 1(3) in the proof of Theorem 3.
(2) From Lemma 1(2) and (3) in the proof of Theorem 3, Bh > Bu > Au > Al. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: (1) Straightforward.
(2) Straightforward.
(3) If β = 1/2 and πs = πb = α/2, π ∈ Π1. Let p = α/2. For this case, ∂Af/∂p =
−2(1 − p)5∆/D2
1 < 0, and
∂Al/∂p = −(1 − p)4((1 − p)4 + 4(1 − p)2 + 4(2 − p)p3)∆/D2
1/(2 − p)2 < 0.
∂Ah/∂p = −∂vb
s/∂p, and ∂Au/∂p = −∂vb
s/∂p/2. Because ∂vb
f/∂p = 2(1 − p)4∆(1 − 2p −
p2)/D2
1, ∂vb
f/∂p is positive for p ∈ (0,a1/2) and negative for p ∈ (a1/2,1/2]. The bid side
is symmetric. Q.E.D.
49Proof of Proposition 7: Ar − Br > Af − Bf for π ∈ Π because
(Ar − Br) − (Af1 − Bf1)
=
(
(1 − πs)(1 − πb)(πs + πb) + (πs − πb)2
)
(1 − πs)(1 − πb)∆/D1/(1 − πsπb)
> 0,
(Ar − Br) − (Af2 − Bf2) = πs
(
(1 − πb)2 + πb
)
(1 − πs)(1 − πb)∆/D2/(1 − πsπb) > 0,
(Ar − Br) − (Af3 − Bf3) = πb
(
(1 − πs)2 + πs
)
(1 − πs)(1 − πb)∆/D3/(1 − πsπb) > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: If β = 1/2 and πs = πb = α/2, π ∈ Π1. Let p = α/2. For this
case,
∂(Au − Al)/∂p = (1 − p)4(1 + 5p2 + 2p3(1 − p))∆/(2 − p)2/D2
1 > 0,
∂(Ah − Af)/∂p = 2(1 − p)4p(1 + p)∆/D2
1 > 0,
∂(Ah − Al)/∂p = (1 − p)4(−3 + 12p − p4)∆/(2 − p)2/D2
1.
Let ψ2(p) = −3 + 12p − p4. ψ2(p) > 0 if p ∈ (a2/2,1/2], ψ2(p) = 0 if p = a2/2, and
ψ2(p) < 0 if p ∈ (0,a2/2). As for Af −Au, ∂(Af −Au)/∂p = −(1−p)4(1+p2)∆/D2
1 < 0.
The bid side is symmetric. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: (1) The probability of a transaction depends on how traders are
matched when two consecutive sellers (buyers) are followed by two consecutive buyers
(sellers). Let’s consider a case where the sequence of the trader arrival to an empty book
is a seller, a seller, a buyer, and a buyer. There are two patterns of transactions. One
is that in which the ﬁrst seller trades with the third buyer and the second seller trades
with the fourth buyer. The other is that in which the second seller trades with the third
buyer, and the ﬁrst seller cannot trade. The probability of a transaction is greatest when
the former case obtains, i.e., when the earlier arrival is matched for a transaction. If a
trader submits a market order to the book with limit orders on the opposite side of the
book on the equilibrium path, a queuing equilibrium always matches the earlier arrival
ﬁrst and thus attains the greatest probability of a transaction.
(2) In a quote-cutting equilibrium, a seller t0 facing an empty book cannot trade
with the buyer tsb because the next trader ts undercuts his ask. Thus, a quote-cutting
equilibrium cannot attain the highest probability of a transaction.
(3) As shown in (1), the probability of a transaction is higher when the earlier arrival is
matched for a transaction. This occurs only if a trader submits a limit order at or behind
the market. In a quote-cutting equilibrium, such an order is more frequently submitted
if the tick size is larger because one-tick quote-cutting takes fewer periods. Q.E.D.
50Proof of Proposition 10: An equilibrium is Type 1 in Theorem 4 if γ = 1. Similar to the
proof of Proposition 2(4), the expected spread sp is sp = (4 + 2α + α(2 − α)δp)∆/(2 +
α)/(2 + αδp). The direct calculation shows ∂sp/∂δp < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11: (1) If α < ˆ α, an equilibrium is Type 1 in Theorem 4, and the
expected spread is sp in the proof of Proposition 10. If α > ˆ α, an equilibrium is Type
2 in Theorem 4. The set of the states of the book on the equilibrium path is {empty,
the book with a LS at Ai, the book with a LB at Bi}, and the stationary distribution is
((2 − α(1 + γ))/(2 + α(1 − γ)),α/(2 + α(1 − γ)),α/(2 + α(1 − γ))). Thus, the expected
spread si under α > ˆ α is
si =
4 + 2α(1 − γ) + α(1 − γ)(2 − α − αγ)δi
(2 + α(1 − γ))(2 + α(1 − γ)δi)
∆.
The diﬀerence of the expected spreads is
si − sp =
2α2∆ψ3(α,δi)
(2 + α)(2 + αδp)(2 + α(1 − γ))(2 + α(1 − γ)δi)
where ψ3(α,δi) = 4(δp − (1 − γ)δi) + 2(1 − γ)(δp − δi)α − (1 − γ)γδpδiα2. Because
∂ψ3(1,δi)/∂δi < 0 and δi < δp, ψ3(1,δi) > ψ3(1,δp) = δpγ(4 − (1 − γ)δp) > 0. si > sp for
any parameter values since ∂2ψ3(α,δi)/∂a2 < 0, ψ3(0,δi) > 0, and ψ3(1,δi) > 0. Thus,
si > sp at α = ˆ α. Because si and sp are continuous in α, sp at α = ˆ α − ϵ is smaller than
si at α = ˆ α + ϵ for small ϵ > 0.
(2) The expected spread is sp under γ > ˆ γ and si under γ < ˆ γ. si takes the smallest
value at γ = 0 under γ < ˆ γ because ∂si/∂γ > 0. At γ = 0, si = (4 + 2α + α(2 −
α)δi)∆/(2 + α)/(2 + αδi), which is greater than sp. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 12: From the stationary distribution in Propositions 2(4) and 11(1),
the transaction probability is α2(1−γ)/(2+α(1−γ)) under γ < ˆ γ and α2/(2+α) under
γ > ˆ γ. Under γ < ˆ γ, the transaction probability takes the largest value α2/(2+α) at γ = 0
because the transaction probability decreases in γ. Thus, the transaction probability is
greater under γ ∈ (ˆ γ,1] than under γ ∈ (0, ˆ γ). Q.E.D.
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54Table 1: Examples of equilibria under one-period expiration.
State of Order in Eq A Eq B
book book seller buyer seller buyer
ω0 no order LS at 2* LB at 1* LS at 2* LB at 2*
ω1 LS at 1 LS at 2 MB LS at 2 MB
ω2 LS at 2 LS at 2* MB* LS at 2* MB*
ω3 LB at 1 MS* LB at 1* LS at 2 LB at 2
ω4 LB at 2 MS LB at 1 MS* LB at 2*
Table 1: The parameter values are vH = 3, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2. Limit
orders are assumed to expire in one period after their submission. A row denotes a state of
the book which is distinguished by an unﬁlled limit order in the book. Eq A and Eq B are
equilibrium proﬁles of strategies. For example, a seller submits a LS at 2 to an empty book
ω0 under Eq A. The strategies denoted by * are those for the states on the equilibrium path.
55Table 2: Examples of equilibria under two-period expiration.
Orders in book Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3
Submitted two Submitted one
periods ago period ago
no order no order LS at 2* LS at 2* LS at 1*
LS at 1 no order LS at 2 LS at 2 LS at 1*
LS at 2 no order LS at 2* LS at 2* LS at 1
LB at 1 no order MS* MS* MS
LB at 2 no order MS MS MS*
no order LS at 1 LS at 1 LS at 2 LS at 1*
no order LS at 2 LS at 1* LS at 2* LS at 1
no order LB at 1 MS* LS at 2* LS at 2
no order LB at 2 MS MS MS*
LS at 1 LS at 1 LS at 2 LS at 2 LS at 1*
LS at 1 LS at 2 LS at 1* LS at 2 LS at 1
LS at 2 LS at 1 LS at 2* LS at 2 LS at 1
LS at 2 LS at 2 LS at 1 LS at 2* LS at 1
LB at 1 LB at 1 LS at 2 MS* MS
LB at 1 LB at 2 MS* MS MS
LB at 2 LB at 1 MS* MS MS
LB at 2 LB at 2 MS MS MS*
LS at 2 LB at 1 LS at 2 LS at 2* LS at 2
LB at 1 LS at 2 MS MS* MS
Table 2: The parameter values are vH = 3, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2. Limit
orders are assumed to expire in two periods after their submission. A row denotes a state
of the book. The book has at most two limit orders under the two-period expiration. Eq 1,
Eq 2, and Eq 3 are equilibrium proﬁles of strategies of sellers. The strategies of buyers are
symmetric for these equilibria. The strategies denoted by * are those for the states on the
equilibrium path.
56Table 3: Eﬀect of expiration period and trader arrival rate.
Expiration periods 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4
Trader arrival rate (α) 1/3 2/3 1 1/3 2/3 1 1/3 2/3 1
Expected spread 12.2 10.6 9.4 11.2 9.4 8.7 10.8 9.0 7.6
Order composition (%)
Market order 21.7 30.8 33.7 26.3 34.2 38.5 29.4 36.4 38.9
Cutting more than one tick 0 0.6 4.8 0 0 2.0 0 1.0 3.1
Cutting by one tick 13.0 22.3 25.7 19.9 28.4 27.4 24.4 29.7 30.4
At the market 7.2 5.1 0 4.2 2.8 3.8 2.7 1.6 0.2
Behind the market 1.5 2.8 3.2 2.2 3.0 5.3 2.3 4.0 5.5
Empty 56.5 38.4 32.6 47.4 31.6 23.1 41.3 27.2 21.8
Table 3: The parameter values are vH = 14, vL = 0, k = 1, and β = 1/2. We designate
market orders as “Market order,” limit orders undercutting the best quote by more than one
tick as “Undercutting by more than one tick,” limit orders undercutting the best quote by
one tick as “Undercutting by one tick,” limit orders at the best quote as “At the market,”
limit orders behind the best quote as “Behind the market,” and limit orders submitted to
an empty book as “Empty.”
Table 4: Eﬀect of tick size reduction.
Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 6
Tick size (k) 7 7 7 3 1 0.5
Expected spread 13.8 13.2 10.2 13.6 14.3 14.7
Order composition (%)
Market order 35.1 33.3 38.5 34.1 33.4 33.3
Undercutting by more than one tick 0 0 0 0 1.2 0.04
Undercutting by one tick 16.2 0 0 27.5 31.5 33.3
At the market 8.1 44.4 38.5 0 0 0
Behind the market 10.8 0 0 6.6 0.8 0.02
Empty 29.7 22.2 23.1 31.9 33.2 33.3
Table 4: The parameter values are vH = 21, vL = 0, α = 1, and β = 1/2. We designate
market orders as “Market order,” limit orders undercutting the best quote by more than one
tick as “Undercutting by more than one tick,” limit orders undercutting the best quote by
one tick as “Undercutting by one tick,” limit orders at the best quote as “At the market,”
limit orders behind the best quote as “Behind the market,” and limit orders submitted to
an empty book as “Empty.”
57Figure 1: Example of quote dynamics


























Figure 1 illustrates an example of quote dynamics of a quote-cutting equilibrium under
vH = 21, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2. The abscissa is the period and the ordinate
the quoted price. The horizontal solid lines indicate the asks and the horizontal broken lines
indicate the bids. Two lines in one period indicate that the book has two limit orders. The
point indicates a transaction. The ﬁgure depicts a case in which the sequence of the type
of traders is sssss sssss bbbbb bbbbb sssss sssbs sssss sbbss, where ‘s’(‘b’) denotes a seller
(buyer).
Figure 2: Trader arrival and the spread










Figure 2 illustrates the relation between the expected spread and the trader arrival rate α.
The basic parameter values are vH = 1, vL = 0, β = 1/2, δp = 1, and δi = 0.2. The solid
line, broken line, and dash-dotted line depict the expected spread under γ = 0.1, γ = 0.25,
and γ = 0.6, respectively. ˆ α = 5/18 ≅ 0.278 for γ = 0.1, ˆ α = 5/6 ≅ 0.833 for γ = 0.25, and
ˆ α = 3.75 for γ = 0.6. At α = 5/18, the solid line moves from 0.970 to 0.994. At α = 5/6,
the broken line moves from 0.827 to 0.963. Points A, B, and C correspond to Points A, B,
and C in Figure 3.
58Figure 3: Share of patient traders and spread









Figure 3 illustrates the relation between the expected spread and the share of the patient
traders γ under vH = 1, vL = 0, β = 1/2, α = 1, δp = 1, and δi = 0.2. ˆ γ = 2/7 ≅ 0.286 for
these parameter values. The expected spread moves from 0.951 to 0.778 at γ = ˆ γ. Points
A, B, and C correspond to Points A, B, and C in Figure 2.











Figure 4: t0 denotes a trader in a given period. In the following period, a seller, denoted by
ts, arrives with probability πs, a buyer, denoted by tb, arrives with probability πb, and no
one arrives with probability z. A seller after ts is denoted by tss and a buyer after ts by tsb.
A seller after tb is denoted by tbs and a buyer after tb by tbb. If no trader arrives following
t0, a seller in the two periods ahead of t0 is denoted by tns and a buyer by tnb.
59Figure 5: Asks and expected utilities
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ΠbH1 z ΠsLHA vLL
ΠbH1 zLHA vLL
ΠbHz ΠbLHA vLL




h. The ﬁgure illustrates the case
with the parameter values vH = 21, vL = 0, k = 1, α = 1, and β = 1/2. Points indicate
asks submitted on the equilibrium path and the corresponding expected utilities. Solid lines
indicate the expected utilities for a seller facing an empty book by submitting a LS at A.
Figure 6: The Set {Π1,Π2,Π3}













Figure 6 depicts {Π1,Π2,Π3}, which is the partition of Π. The curved line g1 = 0 separates
Π2 from Π1, and the curved line g2 = 0 separates Π3 from Π1.
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